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ABSTRACT 
This study considers the role of coercive lever exercise in Chinese economic statecraft.  
Whereas the economic statecraft literature presumes larger economic powers dominate 
smaller economic powers, this study considers cases in which asymmetric 
interdependence in specific sectors allows relatively less developed states to access 
coercive levers as viable policy options.  It found that coercive lever exercise remains 
rare relative to inducements in Chinese economic statecraft consistent with evolving 
Chinese grand strategy and political economy trends.  As demonstrated in the case 
studies, exercise patterns were reactionary and depended on existing conditions of 
asymmetric interdependence with the target state.  Beijing can and will exercise coercive 
levers in the context of a bilateral trade dispute or during select high-stakes international 
crises, but only to an extent that exercise supports achievement of limited political 
objectives such as signaling resolve, amplifying official protest or altering short-term 
behavior in the target state.  Though reluctant to exercise coercive levers, China’s 
capabilities are evolving and it is becoming a more confident practitioner that selects 
among an increasingly sophisticated range of policy options in economic statecraft.  As 
China continues to deepen integration with the global economy, coercive levers derived 
from asymmetric interdependence will likely proliferate. 
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I.  THE RISE OF CHINESE ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
1. Japan Bashing with Chinese Characteristics 
On September 23, 2010, China suspended rare earth exports to Japan in response 
to a maritime crisis near the disputed Senkakus Islands, located in the East China Sea.  
These sanctions followed weeks of diplomatic efforts to release a Chinese fishing boat 
Captain detained by Japanese authorities after his trawler collided with two Japanese 
Coast Guard vessels earlier in September.  There was no press conference announcing 
these sanctions on 17 elements found on the periodic table and in thousands of advanced 
applications in the global economy; industry sources notified the media that outbound 
shipments to Japan remained tied to the pier.  In fact, before these reports, most informed 
readers probably associated rare earths with geologists rather than geopolitics.  Yet to 
observers like economist Paul Krugman, the episode revealed a “rogue economic 
superpower, unwilling to play by the rules.”1  The implications played into the ongoing 
U.S. political debate over China’s relative economic gains since the 2008 global financial 
crisis and fears Beijing might use its economic power to undermine the international 
system.  If China sanctioned Japan over a relatively minor maritime crisis, then it might 
just as easily ban other exports, manipulate its currency or unload vast holdings of U.S. 
debt to get its way in international politics.  
Rare earths became intertwined with competing interpretations of China’s 
economic rise, its deepening integration with the global economy, and the benefits and 
risks of interdependence.  Economic statecraft is an increasingly visible feature of 
Chinese behavior in the international system.  Broadly defined, economic statecraft is 
politics by economic means.  Known as levers, means can induce (e.g., foreign aid) or 
coerce (e.g., sanctions).  Exercise of both types of levers is neither new nor unusual in 
international relations.  Yet the process driving the decision to exercise coercive levers in 
Chinese economic statecraft is not well understood.  For example, why did Beijing target 
                                                 
1 Paul Krugman, “Rare and Foolish,” The New York Times, October 18, 2010, A35.  
 2
Tokyo during this particular crisis?  Why did it select rare earths as an economic lever in 
response to a security crisis?  What did it hope to achieve politically?  This study 
analyzes the 2010 Senkakus crisis and compares how China exercised sanctions in that 
case with other examples of coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft over the past 
decade.  It poses a basic question: What is the role of coercive levers in Chinese 
economic statecraft? 
2. Infinite Interpretations of China’s Rise, Few Coercive Levers 
How China intends to use its economic power after more than thirty years of 
unprecedented growth is among the most pressing topics in contemporary international 
relations.  This concern is not unique to the economic sphere.  Analysis of Chinese 
foreign policy behavior in political and military issue areas confronts similar open 
questions, from People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization to Chinese territorial 
claims in the South China Sea.  The vast extent of Chinese integration with the global 
economy is undeniable, however.  China is the premier manufacturing, trading and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) hub in East Asia, the world’s largest producer and its 
second largest economy, and the leading trade partner with the European Union, the 
United States and Japan among many others.2  These developments have not only raised 
China’s global economic clout, but also broadened Beijing’s opportunities to increase 
political influence abroad through economic statecraft.  
As a topic that integrates political economy and international relations issues, 
economic statecraft is an increasingly visible feature of China’s evolving role in the 
international system.  Given that economic statecraft is the exercise of economic means 
to achieve political goals, beyond the precondition of sufficient economic power, 
developing relationships through economic exchanges is the first step toward wielding it 
successfully.  Examples abound of Chinese efforts to develop commodities markets from 
Middle Eastern oil and African minerals to Latin American steel and South East Asian 
timber, often displacing Japan or the United States as the primary trading partner in these 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of Chinese integration in East Asia, see for example: Andrew MacIntyre, T.J. 
Pempel and John Ravenhill eds., Crisis as Catalyst: Asia’s Dynamic Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
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regions.3  Within East Asia, China’s expansive economic ties with South Korea, its 
“economics first, politics later” approach across the Taiwan Strait and its charm offensive 
in Southeast Asia evoke shifts in the so-called regional balance of influence.4  Many of 
these activities support China’s foreign policy efforts to assuage fears its post-Cold War 
rise will be less than peaceful, to accommodate neighbors when feasible and to manage 
its global reputation as a “responsible major power” that promotes “win-win” cooperation 
abroad.5 
Despite an apparent ubiquity of Chinese economic activity across the globe, 
examples of coercive levers in economic statecraft are both rare and understudied.  By 
comparison, the United States has no less than 11 different types of active sanctions 
against China alone, many dating back to the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.6  Either China does 
not apply coercive levers often, or at the very least, these actions are underreported.  Or, 
as scholars Abdelal and Kirshner note, this “dearth of examples of such coercion” may 
reflect an evolving foreign policy preference for benign influence over more explicit 
forms of coercion.7  In fact there are examples of Chinese coercive levers affecting select 
trade markets for short durations, including the China-South Korea “garlic wars,” the 
China-Japan “tatami mat wars” and sanctions against business interests associated with 
former Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian in the early 2000s.8  In another example, 
China briefly suspended economic exchanges with Singapore in response to then Deputy 
                                                 
3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China's Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, 
America, and Southeast Asia, by Thomas Lum, et al., CRS Report R40361 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, February 25, 2009).  
4 William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., China’s Rise: And the Balance of Influence in Asia 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); Alan D. Romberg, “Taiwan Elections Head to the 
Finish: Concerns, Cautions, and Challenges” China Leadership Monitor 36 (2012), 19. 
5 Susan Shirk, “The Responsible Power,” in China: Fragile Superpower (NY: Oxford University 
Press), 105–139. 
6 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, China Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. 
Rennack, CRS Report RL31910 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 
February 1, 2006).  
7 Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Sanctions, and the Definition of National 
Interests,” Security Studies 9:1–2 (1999): 119–156. 
8 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in 
East Asia” Security Studies 15:3 (2006): 355–395; Adam Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and the 
Political Economy of Asian Security” in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. 
Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007): 146–161. 
 4
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s unofficial visit to Taiwan in 2004.9  Major long-term 
examples involve China’s ongoing participation in multi-lateral nuclear non-proliferation 
sanctions against Iran and North Korea under the auspices of United Nations Security 
Council resolutions 1929 and 1874.10  Despite these examples, China tends to prefer non-
coercive levers that induce rather than coerce.  
In broad terms, this study analyzes means and ends driving Chinese economic 
statecraft.  Since the 1990s, a growing literature assessed state responses to China’s 
economic rise, China’s deepening integration with the global economy, and Chinese 
economic statecraft.11  Given limited data and scholarly analysis of coercive levers, 
Chinese preferences for exercising those levers are unclear.12  This study seeks to parse 
out the underlying mechanism driving coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft.  
How does Beijing select a particular lever to punish a target state or another foreign 
policy actor?  What conditions, events or issues could trigger the decision to exercise the 
lever?  How does Beijing exercise the lever, for how long and what does it want to 
achieve?  In an effort to explain this process in contemporary Chinese economic 
statecraft, this thesis focuses on examples of coercive levers over the past decade.  In 
particular, it considers cases since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 
2001, a period in which China deepened integration with the global economy and 
accelerated economic growth.  At the same time, asymmetric interdependence evolved in 
                                                 
9 Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The Search for Regional Order (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2008): 100–105. 
10 See U.S. State Department fact sheet on UNSC Resolutions 1718 and 1874 accessed at: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/124709.htm 
11 Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement 
Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait,” Journal of Peace Research 43:5 (2006): 
524–541; Scott L. Kastner and Paul A. Papayoanou, “Assessing the Policy of Engagement with China.” 
Policy Papers Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California Berkeley, July 1998; 
Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia 
to China’s Rise (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008); Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise 
of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia”; Adam Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and 
the Political Economy of Asian Security.” In China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. 
William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007): 146–164; 
John Ravenhill, “Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 46:5 (September/ October 
2006): 653–674.   
12 According to neo-liberal theorists, state preferences, or interests, are shaped by domestic politics 
and the external environment.  See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory 
of International Politics.” International Organization 51:4 (1997): 513–553. 
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select economic niches, expanding Beijing’s capability to exercise levers in economic 
statecraft.  
3. Integration, Interdependence, and Power Transition Theory  
Chinese economic statecraft relates directly to competing interpretations of 
China’s rise and whether China will become a revisionist or status quo power.13  For 
those who perceive a revisionist China, its deepening integration with the global 
economy grips popular, academic and policy imaginations that increasingly interpret any 
aspect of Chinese foreign policy behavior as a threat.  Economic statecraft increases 
China’s relative power in support of revisionist aims, including aspirations to regional 
hegemony in East Asia while pushing out the United States.14  Coercion then confirms 
the obvious by crossing the functional boundary between economics and security on 
behalf of revisionist politics.  Others contend the global proliferation of Chinese 
economic exchanges and economic statecraft in developing states undermines liberal 
democracy by exporting a China development model that is neither liberal, nor 
democratic.15   
                                                 
13 Examples of this vast literature are: Jack S. Levy, “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China” 
in China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu 
Feng (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008): 11–33; Avery Goldstein, “Power Transitions, Institutions, 
and China’s Rise in East Asia: Theory, Expectations and Evidence,” in The United States and Northeast 
Asia: Debates, Issues and New Order, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon Lanham (MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2008), 39–78.; Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise 
of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security, 31:1 (2006): 81–126.; Alastair Iain 
Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?,” International Security, 27:4 (2003): 5–56.; Alastair Iain 
Johnston and Robert S. Ross eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: 
Routledge, 1999). 
14 Stephen M. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, “Great Power Politics in the 21st Century,” The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001): 360–402; C. Fred Bergsten, “China and Economic 
Integration in East Asia: Implications for the United States,” Peterson Institute in International Economics, 
Policy Briefs PB07-3 (2007): 1-10; Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s 
Dominance is a Sure Thing,” Foreign Affairs 90:5 (2011). 
15 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s soft Power is Transforming the World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Eric Farnsworth, “The New Mercantilism: China’s Emerging Role in 
the America’s,” Current History (2011); Nazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, “China’s Illiberal Challenge,” 
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 2 (Fall 2006): 56–68.  For a counterargument, see Scott Kennedy, “The 
Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal Of Contemporary China 19:65 (June 2010): 461–77. 
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According to proponents of a status quo China, this deepening economic 
integration and economic statecraft reflect the inevitability of China’s rise in East Asia. 
Instead of conflict, this process presents engagement opportunities to socialize China to 
status quo norms, promote regional economic growth and enhance global stability.  In 
contrast with revisionist advocacy for less Chinese economic statecraft, the status quo 
approach argues for more.  For example, the United States lauded China’s oil embargo 
and financial asset freeze against North Korea during the 2003 and 2006 nuclear crises, 
and it continues to rely on Beijing as a key intermediary with the hermit kingdom.16  
Driven by massive energy demand, Chinese investment in hydrocarbon sources has 
enhanced competition and diversified global energy supplies.17  And China’s Southeast 
Asian charm offensive has not necessarily undermined U.S. influence in that region, and 
instead, helped Southeast Asia in ways aligned with U.S. interests.18  Certainly China’s 
economic rise challenges the status quo international system in important ways, 
potentially altering rules and norms to suit Chinese interests.19  Though many Sinologists 
contend Beijing is more concerned with sustaining economic development through 
deepening integration in the global economy, than with revising a system it pursued for 
more than forty years.20 
                                                 
16 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, And Minds (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008), 172–3. 
17 Theodore H. Moran, China’s Energy Strategy to Secure Natural Resources: Risks, Dangers, and 
Opportunities (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010), 41. 
18 Michael A. Glosny, “Heading Toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy 
Toward Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 2:1 (2006): 24–57. 
19 Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” 
International Security 34:2 (2009): 7–45; Jonathan Kirshner, “The Consequences of China’s Economic 
Rise for Sino–U.S. Relations: Rivalry, Political Conflict, and (Not) War,” in China’s Ascent: Power, 
Security and the Future of the International Politics Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008): 238–259. 
20 Forty years is based on U.S.-China rapprochement in 1971–2 and PRC recognition in the United 
Nations on November 25, 1971, replacing the Republic of China (ROC).  Political economy treatments of 
China’s rise include: C. Fred Bergsten et al, eds., China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009); William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski, ed. 
China’s Rise: and the Balance of Influence in Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007); 
Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); C. Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas R. Lardy, Derek Mitchell, China, The 
Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know about the Emerging Superpower (New York, Public 
Affairs, 2007). 
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Economic statecraft depends on interdependent economic exchanges to advance 
political interests.  Interdependence is not risk free; its quality matters.21  Advocacy for 
deepening economic integration with China regardless of security consequences may 
reflect the elusive “China dream” of 1.32 billion consumers – a variant of Norman 
Angell’s cautionary tale in The Great Illusion.22  From a Chinese perspective, export-led 
growth based increasingly on U.S., European and Japanese demand raises a 
complementary dilemma: “the more developed and prosperous the country becomes, the 
more insecure and threatened they [the CCP] feel.”23  The relevant question for analysts 
is whether economic interdependence between states skews to one side over the other, 
creating a disproportionate capacity for political influence.  This asymmetric 
interdependence can exist broadly at the aggregate economic level or narrowly in specific 
economic issue areas.24 
Chinese economic statecraft involves economic issues that arise with considerable 
frequency between states, such as trade disputes, energy resource competition and foreign 
aid distribution.25  These issues typically do not provoke war, but can become persistent 
sources of intense “political conflict and rivalry” between states that, if managed poorly, 
alter the course of bilateral relationships.26  These issues amount to the facts of life in 
foreign affairs.  In this context, economic statecraft is a fairly routine tool of national 
power; coercive lever exercise does not necessarily convey a value judgment on whether 
a state has revisionist or status quo intentions.27 
                                                 
21 See Kenneth Waltz’s discussion of interdependence as a mutual vulnerability in chapter 7 of Theory 
of International Politics (New York, McGraw Hill, 1979): 128–160; Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. 
Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York, NY: Longman Publishers, 1977).  Susan Shirk China: 
Fragile Superpower (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008): 24–34. 
22 The term comes from Joe Studwell, The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped 
Market on Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2003): 3-25.   
23 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 5. 
24 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 242. 
25 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were the first to point out that military force is relatively rare in 
international relations and that military power does not easily convert to other issue areas.  
26 Kirshner, “The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. Relations: Rivalry, Political 
Conflict, and (Not) War,” 238–259. 
27 Chris Buckley, “UPDATE 1-China denounces U.S. sanctions on company dealing with Iran,” 
Reuters, January 14, 2012. 
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Most of the attention given to expanding Chinese economic exchanges and 
economic statecraft involves weaker, developing nations in which Chinese wealth has 
obvious advantages.  This view is consistent with the economic statecraft literature 
pioneered by Albert Hirschman on the advantages of larger states over smaller states in 
trade relations.28  This study argues asymmetric interdependence in specific sectors 
allows China to pursue economic statecraft against more powerful states with more 
sophisticated market economies.  These conditions present Beijing with levers it is 
uniquely positioned to exercise.  But it is less clear when these conditions will prevail, 
and under what circumstances coercive levers will arise as viable policy options. 
4. Why Study Coercive Levers in Chinese Economic Statecraft? 
This study focuses on Chinese economic statecraft for three reasons.  First, 
sustained economic growth is the principal feature of China’s rise, which as a 
consequence, represents a source of both international prestige and domestic political 
legitimacy.29  Reflecting a strong growth-oriented consensus, Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) leadership prioritized economic development consistently since the inauguration 
of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1979.  In the 1990s, Chinese leadership embraced 
globalization as a necessary condition to continued growth and launched another phase of 
economic reforms designed to deepen integration with the global economy.  Since then, 
the Chinese economy sustained unprecedented growth (~9.5% annual GDP) and achieved 
two key milestones: accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and overtaking 
Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010. 
Second, due to high levels of interdependence between China and the global 
economy, economic statecraft plays an increasingly important role in Chinese foreign 
policy by promoting Chinese growth at home and influence abroad.  Beijing typically 
refers to these efforts as “economic diplomacy” to support its “peaceful development,” 
but this context is consistent with economic statecraft as defined in the literature.  A 
                                                 
28 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980). 
29 For a discussion of China’s efforts to develop comprehensive national power, see Lampton, The 
Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds. 
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prevailing consensus among scholars follows that Chinese leaders are convinced 
preserving a benign foreign policy environment is crucial to sustaining economic growth, 
and therefore, the CCP’s political legitimacy.30  In sum, economic development is 
Beijing’s primary domestic and foreign policy priority.  As a component of Chinese 
grand strategy, economic statecraft supports the preservation of a benign foreign policy 
environment to sustain domestic growth.  It also promotes China as a responsible major 
power abroad.  
Third, scholars focus too much on the security aspects of China’s rise and not 
enough on economic issues.  This study’s emphasis on economic statecraft does not 
discount the importance of security issues, rather it relates directly to “security 
externalities” that develop as a consequence of economic exchanges.31  Chinese 
economic statecraft can and does shape security outcomes, though results are mixed.32  
Development of asymmetric interdependence in the rare earth industrial sector and then 
exercise of the rare earth lever in a security crisis is a key example.  Instead of the 
shifting naval balance in the Western Pacific, or other apparently efficacious symbols of 
China’s rising power, this study looks at punitive mechanisms in economic statecraft that, 
falling short of armed conflict, crosscut economic and security issues in meaningful 
ways.  Analysis across these issue areas is therefore crucial to enriching understanding of 
Chinese economic statecraft and providing the academic and policy communities with 
accurate content.  It follows that coercive lever analysis isolates a variable with 
comprehensive implications for Chinese foreign policy behavior. 
5. Thesis Overview 
This study is organized into two parts.  The first part covers domestic sources of 
Chinese economic statecraft based on research in the political economy and international 
                                                 
30 Lampton, 79, 246–247; Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 24–34; David Shambaugh, “China 
Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, 29:3 (Winter 2004/05): 64–99; 
Keller and Rawski, ed. China’s Rise: and the Balance of Influence in Asia; Bergsten et al, eds., China’s 
Rise: Challenges and Opportunities.  
31 William Norris, “Thinking Clearly About China’s Economic Statecraft,” Precis (2009): 6–9. 
32 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East 
Asia”; Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to 
China’s Rise. 
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relations fields.  The intent is to lay the groundwork for the case studies.  This part is 
deliberately broad in scope to address a range of internal factors shaping Chinese 
economic statecraft including Chinese grand strategy, domestic politics and industrial 
sector development.  It describes structural conditions underlying asymmetric 
interdependence in Chinese economic statecraft based on two assumptions.  First, certain 
types of asymmetric interdependence can support exercise of coercive levers in economic 
statecraft even if China is the relatively less developed economic power.  Second, 
asymmetric interdependence can develop intentionally as an outcome of Chinese grand 
strategy or unintentionally due to side-effects of economic policies, such as consolidating 
value-added supply chains or pegging the renminbi (RMB) to the dollar.  Either way, this 
asymmetric interdependence provides Beijing with coercive levers in economic statecraft.  
These levers can become viable policy options if and when situational factors allow 
Beijing to pursue desired policy objectives against a target state.  
The second part of this study uses the case study method to investigate the role of 
coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft.  This part includes a major case and four 
mini-cases.  The major case involves China’s suspension of rare earth element (REE) 
shipments to Japan in response to a 2010 maritime incident that occurred in disputed 
waters in the East China Sea.33  It is a clear example of coercive lever exercise to achieve 
multiple outcomes (e.g., economic, political and security). The first three mini-cases 
include the Sino-Korean garlic wars (1999–2000), the Sino-Japanese tatami mat wars 
(2001) and the Sino-American arms sanctions in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan 
(2010).  While the Sino-Japanese case and the first two mini-cases feature examples of 
explicit lever exercise, the Sino-American mini-case features an example of implicit 
coercive lever exercise.  The relevant question is whether China can pursue explicit 
exercise as a viable policy option against the United States, meaning a shift from threat to 
                                                 
33 Examples of international media, trade press, think tank, academic and U.S. government sources for 
rare earths are: Keith Bradsher, “China is Blocking Minerals, Executives Say,” The New York Times, 
September 24, 2010; Cindy A. Hurst, “China’s Rare Earth Industry: What Can the West Learn?” 
Washington D.C., Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), March 2010; Robert Looney, 
“Recent Developments of a New Technocratic Mercantilism Emerging in China?” World Economics 12:1 
(2011); U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Rare Earth Elements: The Global 
Supply Chain, by Marc Humphries, CRS Report R41347 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, September 6, 2011). 
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action.  The Sino-Japanese case is the heart of this study, given its clarity as an example 
of explicit coercive lever exercise in a security context.  This study will compare findings 
across cases to determine if discernible patterns or key shifts offer general implications 
for Chinese economic statecraft. 
Mention of Chinese economic statecraft in casual conversation often evokes 
Chinese efforts to strengthen economic exchanges with developing nations in Latin 
America, Africa and Southeast Asia.  While China is itself still classified as a developing 
nation by the World Trade Organization, its economy is significantly larger than any 
country in these regions.  As such, there are valid reasons for expanding research of 
coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft beyond Northeast Asia.  By focusing on 
the United States and Japan - the world’s first and third largest economies - this study 
considers patterns of economic statecraft between large economic powers in which China 
plays the role of a developing state or a near peer competitor.  The case studies feature 
asymmetric interdependence in specific sectors that provide Beijing with levers that 
become viable policy options in economic statecraft.  These conditions apply even when 
China is a less developed economic power compared to the United States or a near peer 
competitor relative to Japan.  Though China surpassed Japan as the second largest 
economy in 2010, trade relations remain relatively balanced, Japan’s economy is more 
mature, and Japan’s per capita GDP remains several times higher. 
This study has three key findings.  First, coercive lever exercise remains rare 
relative to inducements in Chinese economic statecraft.  These application preferences 
are based on the convergence of Chinese grand strategy, foreign policy making and 
political economy trends.  Second, in each of the cases, exercise patterns were reactionary 
and China relied on coercive levers derived from asymmetric interdependence with the 
target state.  Beijing can and will exercise coercive levers in the context of a bilateral 
trade dispute or during select high-stakes international crises, but only to an extent that 
exercise supports limited political objectives such as signaling resolve, dispute resolution 
or altering specific behavior in the target state.  Third, though reluctant to exercise 
coercive levers, China’s capabilities are evolving and it is becoming a more confident 
practitioner that selects among an increasingly sophisticated range of policy options in 
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economic statecraft.  As China continues to deepen integration with the global economy, 
coercive levers derived from asymmetric interdependence will likely proliferate. 
The study is organized as follows.  Each part has two chapters.  Chapter II defines 
key terms and concepts, presents two hypotheses and reviews economic statecraft 
literature including sources specific to Chinese economic statecraft.  Chapter III covers 
Chinese grand strategy and foreign policy making, an overview of Chinese political 
economy trends affecting economic statecraft, and a detailed description of China’s rare 
earth sector.  In part II, chapter IV examines the Sino-Japanese rare earth case, while 
chapter V treats comparative factors across the mini-cases.  Chapter V concludes the 
study with a discussion of implications for the role of coercive levers in Chinese 
economic statecraft.  In sum, part one of this study attempts to identify the causal factors 
that developed asymmetric interdependence in the cases.  It then explains what China 
does with coercive levers in part two.   
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II.  HIRSCHMANESQUE LOGIC, CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS   
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces key terms, definitions and concepts in economic statecraft 
and describes recent research relevant to Chinese economic statecraft.  The first section 
defines economic statecraft, asymmetric interdependence and implicit and explicit 
coercive levers as key terms used throughout this study.  The next section describes the 
problems and hypotheses the study addresses: first (H1), China applies explicit coercive 
levers rarely, and instead prefers the flexibility of implicit coercive levers; second (H2), 
when China does apply explicit coercive levers, the intent is to achieve limited outcomes 
such as signaling resolve, official protest or short-term shifts in a target state’s behavior.   
The chapter then begins a literature review, which covers classics in economic statecraft, 
Chinese economic statecraft in East Asia and Chinese economic statecraft in Sino-
American relations.  The last section describes concepts to isolate coercive levers in 
Chinese economic statecraft in stages: asymmetric, situational, exercise and effects.   
B. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
1. What is Economic Statecraft? 
Economic statecraft and international economic exchanges are not synonymous, 
particularly since exchanges can occur between autonomous economic actors.  By 
definition, the state plays a leading role in economic statecraft, though it relies heavily on 
economic actors for implementation.  And while international economic exchanges can 
exist without economic statecraft, establishing the former is a necessary precondition of 
the latter.  Like all forms of statecraft, economic statecraft applies national instruments of 
power as means to influence political outcomes.  Unlike other forms of statecraft, the 
means are economic.  Beyond this broad definition, this study draws heavily from the 
influential work of Albert Hirschman and David Baldwin.  Most analysis of economic 
statecraft begins with reference to Hirschman’s 1945 classic, National Power and the 
Structure of Foreign Trade, in which he highlighted the political consequences of 
international trade through analysis of Hitler’s political subordination of Eastern Europe 
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in the 1930s through asymmetric trade relations.  He found that beyond the blunt 
mercantilism characteristic of 16–18th century Europe, trade during the interwar era 
(1918–1939) extended power politics in subtle, though nonetheless significant ways.  The 
premise was simple: asymmetric trade relations have political consequences, particularly 
when a predatory state seeks more than wealth.  It follows that, “a country trying to make 
the most of its strategic position of its own trade will try precisely to create the conditions 
that make the interruption of trade of much graver concern to its trading partners than to 
itself.”34  Despite Hirschman’s enduring influence on the literature, he did develop the 
concept of economic statecraft in his research. 
As such, this study builds upon Baldwin’s authoritative definition of this concept 
from his 1985 book, Economic Statecraft, as “influence attempts relying primarily on 
resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”35  
Specifically, this study adopts Baldwin’s “means-ends analysis” by folding the above 
definition of techniques into economic means.36  By definition, economic statecraft 
involves exercise of economic levers such as sanctions, foreign aid or trade agreements 
by states to achieve policy goals.  At least two states participate in economic statecraft: 
the sending state exercises the lever and the target state absorbs the effects.  While these 
levers must be economic, the political objectives and desired outcomes, such as a change 
in a target state’s behavior, can be non-economic and still meet the criteria of economic 
statecraft.37  For example, while China has resource interests in sub-Saharan Africa, it 
only provides aid to those countries that support its “One China” policy, normalizing 
relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rather than Taiwan.38  In sum, 
economic statecraft encompasses a range of economic levers applied deliberately “to get 
others to do what they would not otherwise do.”39  
                                                 
34 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 16. 
35 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 13–14.  See 
tables 2 and 3 on pages 41–42 for an extensive list of potential levers.  
36 Ibid., 16. 
37 Ibid., 39–42. 
38 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Lum, “China’s 
Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.” 
39 Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 9. 
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2. What are Coercive Levers and Why Does Asymmetry Matter? 
While all outcomes of economic statecraft are potentially coercive based on the 
above definition, not all levers are coercive.  In fact, economic statecraft often strives to 
develop “influence effects” through application of non-coercive levers that function as 
economic inducements (e.g., foreign aid, licensing agreements), luring a target state 
toward the sending state’s desired political outcomes.40  For example, attaching an 
annual aid package to bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with a 
developing country creates both short and long-term incentives to sustain mutually 
beneficial economic exchanges.  Over time, the sending state acquires political influence 
in the target state’s domestic politics, primarily through constituencies that have the most 
to gain from preserving an inducement.  While influence effects matter, this study more 
concerned with the exercise of another kind of lever, namely coercive levers. 
In all cases, this study refers to coercive levers as punitive measures (e.g., 
sanctions, embargoes, tariffs, and financial measures) applied or threatened in the context 
of bilateral asymmetric interdependence.  Because there are different types of levers in 
economic statecraft, states must weigh the costs and benefits of selecting levers as viable 
policy options.  It follows that as with all forms of statecraft, transaction costs have a 
direct bearing on decision-making in economic statecraft.41  This definition borrows two 
additional concepts: asymmetry and explicit versus implicit coercion.  
In the first concept, this study differentiates Hirschman’s asymmetric trade 
relations from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s asymmetric interdependence.  Though 
he did not use these precise terms, from a Hirschmanesque perspective, asymmetry 
develops between two trading nations if the smaller, poorer state has more at stake in the 
trade relationship than the larger, richer state.  This asymmetry gives the larger state 
coercive leverage through either explicit or implicit threats to disrupt trade relations.  In 
most cases, the smaller state yields because it cannot suspend trade in a given article or 
                                                 
40 The concept of influence effects, belongs to Hirschman.  See also the discussion of sanctions and 
inducements in Jean-Marc F. Blanchard et al, “The Political Economy of National Security: Economic 
Statecraft, Interdependence, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 9:1–2 (199): 1–14. 
41 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 15. 
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alternative market transaction costs, including stockpiling and developing new supplies, 
are too high.42  Larger states may also make economic concessions to increase the 
smaller state’s dependence and to influence its domestic politics.43  In contrast, Keohane 
and Nye argue asymmetry does not always favor larger, more powerful states.  When this 
happens, it may reflect problems of power conversion between issue areas (e.g., military 
to economic) or the advantages of less powerful states under certain conditions of 
asymmetric interdependence.44  Rather than antagonizing the more powerful state head 
on, these “states will try to use asymmetrical interdependence in particular groups of 
issues as a source of power.”45  Building on both approaches, this study argues less 
sophisticated economic powers can exploit conditions of asymmetric interdependence to 
exercise coercive levers in economic statecraft. 
Explicit coercion involves official and/or observable actions to exercise levers 
punitively, while implicit coercion involves the threat to exercise levers punitively 
without necessarily taking action.  Differentiating between explicit and implicit coercion 
poses an analytical challenge.  Sanctions announced at a press conference may appear to 
be a clear example of explicit coercion, depending on whether the sending state follows 
through with action against its target.  Implicit coercion does not reveal itself as easily 
and can occur during closed meetings between diplomats.  The analyst then must assess if 
observable outcomes result from implicit coercion, often based on speculation and 
second-hand sources of dubious quality.  Alternatively, implicit coercion may prove more 
normal than acknowledged, reflecting scholarly selection bias against coercive levers in 
general.46  In fact, Drezner argues implicit coercion plays a key role in closed-door 
negotiations which can become manifest through game theory analysis.  This study finds 
                                                 
42 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, vii, x, xi, 30–31. 
43 Rawi Abdelal and Jonathan Kirshner, “Strategy, Economic Sanctions, and the Definition of 
National Interests,” Security Studies 9:1–2 (1999): 119–156; See Jonathan Kirshner’s summary in chapter 2 
of the Routledge Handbook of International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation, Mark 
Blyth, ed., (New York: Routledge, 2009).  
44 Keohane, and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 238–240. 
45 Ibid., 242. 
46 Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57 
(2003): 643–659. 644. 
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Drezner’s approach compelling, but given the secrecy associated with Chinese 
diplomacy, does not expect sufficient evidence of this type of implicit coercive lever. 
C. DIVINING CHINESE COERCIVE LEVER PREFERENCES 
This study addresses how China exercises coercive levers in the context of 
asymmetric interdependence.  All forms of statecraft involve an interactive decision-
making process of weighing various policy options and matching capabilities to desired 
objectives under domestic and international constraints.  Outcomes represent the 
observable features of international relations.  To the extent the data allow, analysis in 
this study focuses on the left side of this process, rather than on effects.  Specifically, this 
study attempts to isolate the causal mechanisms driving Beijing’s employment of explicit 
and implicit coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft.  It follows that if these 
conditions are understood, then analysts can make more accurate predictions on how, 
why and when China might apply coercive levers in the future. 
This study will test two hypotheses on the role of coercive levers in Chinese 
economic statecraft (H1 and H2).  First (H1), China applies explicit coercive levers 
rarely, and instead prefers the flexibility of implicit coercive levers.  There are several 
potential explanations.  Either China is not yet capable of applying explicit levers more 
frequently due to political economy constraints (e.g., uneven development, central-local 
politics, bureaucratic bargaining), or China is risk averse to political, military and 
economic consequences of applying explicit coercive levers.  For example, application 
could undermine China’s reputation management as a responsible power.   
Second (H2), when China does exercise explicit coercive levers, the intent is to 
achieve limited outcomes such as signaling resolve, official protest or short-term shifts in 
a target state’s behavior.  It may be the type of asymmetric relationship producing the 
coercive lever constrains outcomes.  More broadly, the comprehensive bilateral 
relationship between China and the target state also constrains application of coercive 
levers, particularly if China perceives that costs of continued exercise outweigh the 
benefits.  It is also possible explicit exercise is an escalatory tactic, resulting if implicit 
exercise fails to achieve objectives.  Another possibility is that China limits application 
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due to a lack of experience with coercive levers, and despite aspirations, cannot yet 
pursue more robust, long-term exercise.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Classics in Economic Statecraft   
This study builds on economic statecraft literature from the International 
Relations sub-field of International Political Economy (IPE) by borrowing key 
definitions, theories and historical case studies underway since the mid-20th century.47  
Literature on Chinese economic statecraft emerged in the post-Cold War era, often 
focusing on how target states responded to China’s economic rise and its increased 
presence as a foreign policy actor.  Most of this literature focuses on the effects of 
Chinese economic statecraft rather than on its application.  For this reason, and because 
actual examples of coercive levers in action are relatively rare, the data are limited and 
understudied. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  First, it departs from 
Hirschmanesque logic in which smaller trading states are subordinate to larger trading 
states.  Hirschman focused on the consequences of international trade relations during the 
mid-20th century when larger states had clear advantages.  In contrast, this study 
considers how asymmetric interdependence in a particular sector can favor a near peer 
competitor or a less developed state under conditions of global interdependence.  This 
approach does not dispute Hirschman’s analytical framework.  Rather it offers another 
way of thinking about asymmetry.  If both states are relatively equal in terms of 
aggregate economic size, then sectorial asymmetry can tip the balance on the margins, 
creating disproportionate leverage in the affected sector.  For example, while China 
surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in 2010, trade relations remain relatively 
balanced, and Japan’s per capita GDP is much larger.  Because Japan depends 
exclusively on China for REE imports, while China can diversify its exports, asymmetric 
interdependence exists in the REE sector.  It does not exist elsewhere, but this condition 
                                                 
47 For an overview of IPE, see Mark Blyth, The Routledge Handbook of International Political 
Economy (IPE): IPE as a Global Conversation (New York: Routledge, 2009).  
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may be sufficient for the exercise of coercive levers.  If one state has significantly more 
aggregate economic power, sectorial asymmetry can offer the weaker state pockets of 
coercive leverage.  As the largest global economy, the United States plays the role of the 
larger state according to Hirschmanesque logic.  Since it maintains massive trade deficits 
with a state that is also the largest foreign U.S. creditor, asymmetric interdependence 
exists with China across balance of payments issues. 
Second, because the data is relatively limited on how China applies coercive 
levers in economic statecraft, this study analyses coercive lever exercise to improve 
understanding of the mechanism in play.  As discussed above, this study draws 
definitions from two key texts, Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of Foreign 
Trade (1945) and Baldwin’s, Economic Statecraft (1985).  Successive generations of 
scholars have built on Hirschman’s interwar case studies, and his argument that economic 
statecraft targets domestic constituencies who have a stake in maintaining dependent 
trade relations that undermine national interests.  For example, Paul Papayoanou 
extended Hirschman, arguing a state’s ability to balance against a perceived threat 
depends on the nature of its political institutions and economic ties. 48  These concepts 
relate to contention that coercive levers develop in stride with specific types of 
asymmetric interdependence.  In part one, this study attempts to identify the causal 
factors that developed these asymmetries in each of the cases.  It then explains what 
China does with coercive levers in part two.   
Analysis of coercive levers as a mechanism within economic statecraft is based on 
Baldwin’s comprehensive analysis of sanctions in Economic Statecraft.  Baldwin 
challenges the denigration of economic statecraft among the press, academics and policy 
analysts (e.g., it does not work, therefore it does not matter).49  Rejecting conventional 
focus on the success or failure of economic statecraft, Baldwin revisits historical cases 
                                                 
48 Paul A. Papayoanou, “Interdependence, Institutions and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, 
and World War I” International Security 20:4 (1996): 42–76. See also Paul A. Papayoanou, Power Ties: 
Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): 
151–167; Kastner and Papayoanou, “Assessing the Policy of Engagement with China.”  
49 For a more recent example of the critique, see Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not 
Work,” International Security 22:2 (1997): 90–136.  
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and applies a nine-point analytical framework that differentiates economic statecraft 
mechanisms (e.g., techniques, levers, goals, outcomes, costs).50  The framework’s 
separation of techniques (e.g., coercive levers) from desired outcomes (e.g., change in 
target state behavior) facilitates a more nuanced analysis of economic statecraft.51  
Baldwin spends considerable effort challenging 16 assumptions on the efficacy of 
economic sanctions (e.g., coercive levers), noting that sending states may pursue multiple 
desired outcomes simultaneously, including signaling resolve.52  In testing H1 and H2, 
this study follows Baldwin’s lead by analyzing how selection of coercive levers ties to 
desired outcomes in Chinese economic statecraft.  By isolating coercive levers, this study 
also builds on Baldwin’s emphasis on analyzing economic statecraft mechanisms, rather 
than privileging the outcomes. 
Analysts continue to study economic statecraft using Baldwin’s methodology.  
For example, Daniel Drezner argues that sanctioning states consider the likelihood of 
conflict with the target, are less likely to sanction allies despite higher success rates, and 
are more likely to sanction adversaries despite lower success rates.53  This study is less 
concerned with the success or failure of coercive levers.  As Baldwin notes, coercive 
levers do not need to achieve all desired outcomes to have a measurable effect, even if 
that effect is limited to support of another form of statecraft.54  This study is however, 
interested in understanding Beijing’s preferences and decision-making processes through 
testing H1 and H2. 
2.  The Rise of Chinese Economic Statecraft in East Asia 
Traditional China’s economic role in East Asia dates back several millennia, 
marked by peaks of activity during the Song (960–1279 CE), Ming (1268–1644 CE) and 
                                                 
50 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 370–4. 
51 Jonathan Kirshner, “Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art,” Security Studies 11:4 (2002): 160–
179.  See his discussion of Baldwin on pages 168–171. 
52 Ibid., 177.   
53 Daniel Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); See also the book review in Jonathan Kirshner, 
“Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art,” Security Studies 11:4 (2002): 160–179. 
54 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 205. 
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Qing (1644–1911) dynasties, in which China integrated into a vast network of global 
commerce.55  This background matters not because those regimes have any meaningful 
resemblance to the CCP, or that China aspires to reassert the Middle Kingdom as some 
suggest,56 but to acknowledge the deep historical roots of regional economic patterns.  
Because the PRC was largely isolated from participation in the global economy during 
most of the Cold War (~1950s–1970s), it lacked opportunities to develop the prerequisite 
political and economic ties to wield economic statecraft.  Except for some interest in 
Chinese foreign aid activities in the developing world in the 1960–70s, the economic 
statecraft literature did not engage China meaningfully until its economic rise accelerated 
in the 1990s.  Known as the second phase of reform, the period marked a transition from 
gradualism to “big bang” economic liberalization in which China deepened integration 
with the global economy.  A process that promoted export-led growth through acquisition 
of best practices and technology transfers from abroad; it culminated with China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.57 
Several analysts focus on the Hirschmanesque influence effects of Chinese 
economic integration and economic statecraft on balance of power politics in East Asia.58 
Given China’s growing economic exchanges in the East Asian region, analysts sought to 
understand whether economic statecraft increased the likelihood of military and political 
alignment with China (e.g., bandwagoning).  For example, based on a 2010 quantitative 
study, Scott Kastner does not find a “consistent, statistically significant relationship 
between a country’s economic ties to China and that country’s willingness to 
                                                 
55 Rhoads Murphey, East Asia: A New History (New Jersey: Longman, 2010), 99–148.  
56 See David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” 
International Security 27:4 (2003): 57–85; for the counterpoint see Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past be 
its Future?,” International Security 28:3 (2003): 149–164. 
57 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007): 
100–110. 
58 Kahler and Kastner, “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the 
Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait”; Kastner and Papayoanou, “Assessing the Policy of 
Engagement with China”; Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security 
Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise; Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: 
Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia”; Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political 
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accommodate PRC interests.”59  Adam Segal notes that short of political alignment, the 
reach of Beijing’s influence varies among developing states in Southeast Asia.  Malaysia 
and Vietnam are not bandwagoning with China, but there is a growing tendency to check 
with Beijing before making commitments to other states.60  Because this study focuses 
less on state responses to China’s economic rise, many findings do not apply directly to 
the role of coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft.  Instead, these sources are 
useful primarily as empirical background on Chinese economic exchanges in East Asia, 
and the ways in which deepening interdependence shapes Chinese economic statecraft 
preferences.  As such, this section divides the literature into two parts: Northeast Asia and 
Southeast Asia. 
a.  Chinese Economic Statecraft in Northeast Asia  
Certain patterns of Chinese economic exchanges in Northeast Asia inform 
tests of H1 and H2.  For example, Robert Ross assesses the political impact of Chinese 
economic ties on secondary states – states that cannot independently defend themselves.  
Of the cases, the smaller economies of South Korea and Taiwan are increasingly 
dependent on the much larger Chinese economy, and are more likely to align with 
Chinese political preferences.  Ross argues China’s economic influence over Taiwan and 
South Korea is primarily due to military dominance and geographic proximity, whereas 
Japan’s larger economy and military alliance with the United States shield it from 
dependency.61  In broad Hirschmanesque terms, this assessment is probably correct, 
though Ross’s main interest remains in the effects of the military balance of power in 
East Asia.  In other words, economic statecraft only matters under conditions of military 
superiority.  This study argues asymmetric interdependence can facilitate access to 
coercive levers despite shifts in the military balance. 
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Ross raises two of the rare examples of explicit coercive levers in Chinese 
economic statecraft during brief trade wars with South Korea and Japan, known as the 
Sino-Korean garlic wars (2000) and Sino-Japanese tatami mat wars (2001).  Both 
examples demonstrate Hirschmanesque effects clearly in which sending state influence 
over a business constituency in the target state overpowered protectionist measures.  In 
the garlic wars, China imposed import bans on South Korean mobile phone parts and 
polyethylene in retaliation for South Korean tariffs on Chinese garlic.  Faced with $100 
million in losses, the South Korean mobile phone parts industry lobbied Seoul to drop the 
tariff, forcing the South Korean garlic industry to cede market share to China.62  
In the tatami mat wars, both sides imposed high tariffs: Japan on Chinese 
leeks, shitake mushrooms, and reeds used to make tatami mats, and China on Japanese 
cars, air conditioners and cell phones.  China incurred fewer relative costs because the 
value of Japanese products far exceeded the value of Chinese leeks.  In response, Japan 
lifted the bans, avoided future trade wars and instead deepened economic integration with 
China.63 As such, China became Japan’s number one trading partner, and a crucial 
destination for Japanese investment and manufacturing.  Yet this type of cooperation did 
not extend to political or military spheres due to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the relative 
size of Japan’s economy.64  These findings apply directly to this study.  An asymmetric 
trade relationship allowed China to apply a coercive lever with limited consequences due 
to its cheaper exports.  It turns out, China’s exercise of the import ban had minimal 
economic impact on Japan.  Because Japan relied on the Chinese market for its 
electronics, it could not sustain the long-term costs of coercive lever exercise.  In fact, 
Japan reconsidered the viability of future import bans against China. 
Like Ross, Segal argues China’s relative military capability is an 
important factor in the development of political influence through economic statecraft.  
Unlike Ross, he argues the target state’s domestic politics and threat perceptions are the 
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main causal variables determining whether influence ultimately transfers.  This is the 
case in Taiwan, but it is particularly evident in Japan.  If the status quo of “cold politics, 
hot economics” continues, then Chinese economic statecraft will make little headway.  
Segal cites the 2005 Sino-Japan clash over natural gas exploration in the East China Sea 
and the subsequent anti-Japanese protests in China as examples of wayward nationalism.  
On the one hand, these events feed into Japan’s “China threat” school and its own 
nationalist sentiments to become a “normal” power.  On the other hand, these events are 
examples of nationalism constraining the policy agenda and jeopardizing economic ties.  
If China wants to wield economic statecraft, it has to “balance nationalist sentiment… 
with the need to maintain stable economic relations.”65 By describing how bilateral 
relationships shape economic statecraft preferences and application, these findings apply 
directly to tests of both H1 and H2 in the Sino-Japanese case study. 
Evan Medeiros and his colleagues look at responses by Japan and five 
other states to Chinese economic growth and integration in East Asia, and like Ross, they 
do not find an increase in bandwagoning.  Medeiros’ focus is on state responses to China, 
but bearing on H2, he suggests China avoids coercive lever application due to perceived 
political consequences.  In fact, he notes, “when China tried to assert itself in such ways, 
its efforts have often been counterproductive, alienating its Asian interlocutors.”66  
Instead, China relies on passive influence to dissuade states from adopting containment 
strategies and to support China’s long-term reputation management. These considerations 
inform H1 predictions on Chinese preferences for implicit coercive levers first, and 
explicit coercive levers as a last resort per H2.  
In a comprehensive survey of bilateral economic engagement involving 
North Korea, South Korea, the former Soviet Union, Taiwan and China, Miles Kahler 
and Scott Kastner evaluate constraining and transformative effects of interdependence.  
For example, while China failed to constrain Taiwanese domestic politics through 
enhanced cross-Strait economic exchanges, it apparently made some gains establishing a 
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pro-China coalition among Taiwanese elites.67  Taiwanese businesses (e.g., the Taishing) 
are heavily invested in the Chinese mainland (~77%) and represent an important 
constituency in Taiwanese domestic politics.  Given an economic stake in favorable 
cross-Strait relations, this coalition “tends to oppose foreign policy goals (like 
independence) that are starkly at odds with Beijing.”68 
For Kahler and Kastner, regime type matters.  The key question is whether 
democracies like Taiwan can manage competitive electoral politics and pursue credible 
foreign policies against authoritarian states like China.  This survey underscores the risks 
of interdependence discussed in chapter I by demonstrating that transformative effects 
work both ways.  On the one hand, democracies can socialize non-democracies to status 
quo norms through economic exchanges.  This premise underscores the policy of 
engagement.  On the other hand, authoritarian states can socialize democratic political 
constituencies through the same exchanges to develop a stake in favorable relations.  
These findings also support tests of H2 in which the domestic political balance in the 
target state weighs heavily on Chinese coercive lever preferences.  This piece also 
reflects the accelerated movement of businesses from Taiwan to the mainland during the 
second phase of reform in ways that parallel movements from Japan. 
b. Chinese Economic Statecraft in Southeast Asia 
This study references select literature on Southeast Asia to primarily to 
test H1 assumptions on the scarcity of coercive lever exercise despite prevailing 
conditions of Hirschmanesque relations.  Because the Chinese economy is significantly 
larger than any economy in Southeast Asia, it is among the regions in which deepening 
Chinese economic integration appears to benefit China more than less developed 
Southeast Asian states.  However, in this region a Chinese preference for inducements 
prevails over coercion (e.g., Hirschmanesque influence effects) an outcome chapter III 
will attempt to explain further.  Though this study focuses primarily on the unanticipated 
consequences of sectorial asymmetric interdependence among more evenly matched 
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economies, Southeast Asia remains a dynamic region in which the long-term effects of 
Chinese economic statecraft continue to evolve.  Future research could focus on bilateral 
relationships in which China could change course and decide to pursue coercive lever 
exercise. 
Research on Southeast Asian state responses to China’s expanding 
economic integration in the region suggests a mixture of enthusiasm and wariness.  States 
are eager to integrate with the Chinese market, but also challenged to become more 
productive.  In fact, structural variance among Southeast Asia’s ten economies creates 
different types of asymmetric interdependence with China that distribute influence in 
unexpected ways.  For example, Evelyn Devadason finds that Sino-Southeast Asian trade 
expanded intra-regional trade, bolstered exports for some countries and enhanced 
integration with Chinese component assembly industries.69  This appears to be a win-win 
outcome, except that some economies fair better than others.70   
Kurlantzick’s account of Chinese economic statecraft in Southeast Asia 
reflects conventional Hirschmanesque logic in which giant China wields significant 
political leverage over the sub-region’s smaller states.71  Consideration of China’s 
foreign policy goals complicates this assessment.  Because China seeks to reassure 
Southeast Asian nations of its peaceful intentions, it has so far been reluctant to employ 
coercive levers, and instead prefers economic inducements (e.g., foreign aid, FDI).  
Tempering alarmist accounts of China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia, Glosny 
argues positive aspects of Chinese economic statecraft improved Sino-Southeast Asian 
relations, but cautions that short and medium-term gains may not develop into a long-
term trend.72 
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Iain Coxhead argues Chinese demand for high-tech components and 
primary goods promotes a structural gap between the ASEAN-6 (Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei) and the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam) economies by skewing development of these sectors.  In the worst 
case, a resource course could develop in which states dependent on primary goods trade 
with China lose incentives to promote further economic development.  As a consequence, 
these states may ultimately deplete indigenous natural resources.73  Like Coxhead, this 
study does not suggest that imposition of a resource curse results from a nefarious 
Chinese strategy.  Beijing’s primary interest in Southeast Asia involves advancing 
Chinese economic development.  Instead, this study considers ways in which asymmetric 
interdependence increases the proliferation of coercive levers.  The question for analysts, 
and future research in this region, is whether Beijing has the intent to exercise these 
levers coercively. 
3.  Chinese Economic Statecraft and the United States 
From a comparative historical perspective, this study draws from literature on 
U.S. economic statecraft in the 1980s-1990s and contemporary research on U.S. 
perceptions of the China economic threat.  The findings support tests of H1 and H2 by 
revealing how patterns of economic and security interdependence between sending and 
target states shape coercive lever preferences.  This section also offers potential 
explanations for why China is less reluctant to exercise coercive levers against Japan than 
against the United States, based on its own threat perceptions as a sending state and its 
awareness of “China threats” in the target state’s domestic politics.  
Michael Mastanduno notes that during the Cold War, U.S. academics and 
policymakers separated economic and security issues, matching the bipolar geo-political 
environment.74  International political economy and security studies scholars pursued 
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separate research agendas.  U.S. security agencies subordinated economic agencies in the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives.  This issue bifurcation worked because, “the 
principal security challenger [the Soviet Union] was not an economic challenger, and the 
principal economic challengers [Japan and Europe] were security allies.”75  A security-
first approach shaped U.S. economic statecraft to an extent the United States granted 
significant economic concessions to target states to enhance security objectives.  Here, 
the United States traded economics for security.  As the next chapter will demonstrate, 
Chinese economic statecraft applies the inverse logic: it prioritizes economic exchanges 
ahead of security ties. 
Mastanduno describes two relevant domestic political trends in the United States 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and rise of globalization, when bifurcation 
began to unravel.  First, a protectionist anti-Japan coalition dominated U.S. trade policy 
in the late 1980s and 1990s by bargaining successfully between security and economic 
stakeholders.  Scholars, journalists, and Hollywood certainly contributed to these 
perceptions, reinterpreting research by Ezra Vogel and Chalmers Johnson.76  Second, due 
to U.S. threat perceptions of Japanese competition, U.S. coercive levers proliferated in 
the form of punitive trade and monetary policies (e.g., pressure on Tokyo to revalue the 
yen), which ultimately faded when the Japanese economy entered stagnation in the 
1990s.77  Applying the above framework in this study, China has assumed Japan’s 
erstwhile role as the principle economic challenger to the United States, though no U.S.-
China security alliance exists.  In fact, the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing global 
recession amplified scrutiny of China’s relative economic gains vis-à-vis the United 
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States.78  Protectionist bills surged in the U.S. Congress and U.S. Republican presidential 
candidate, Governor Mitt Romney, vowed to declare China a currency manipulator his 
first day in office, a label with WTO consequences.79 
Since China competes with both Japan and the United States as a non-ally, 
Papayoanou’s research on balancing under conditions of interdependence and Drezner’s 
sanctions paradox apply to Chinese coercive levers in this study.  As Papayoanou argues, 
balancing against a perceived threat depends on a state’s institutional context and its 
economic relations.80  If states have extensive economic ties with a potential enemy, then 
it may be difficult to achieve sufficient domestic political consensus to balance credibly 
against a perceived threat.  Underbalancing occurs instead.81  The central argument of 
Drezner’s Sanctions Paradox assumes that two factors inform state decisions to exercise 
coercive levers: target and sending state transaction costs; the likelihood of conflict.  On 
the one hand, a state is more likely to sanction a non-ally if conflict dominates bilateral 
relations, but the likelihood of success is limited.  On the other hand, a state may have 
difficulty sanctioning an ally due to closer political and economic ties (e.g. complex 
interdependence), though success is more likely for precisely the same reasons.82   
These findings support this study’s premise that the nature of interdependence 
between the sending and target state matters.  At the very least, it impacts lever capacity 
and exercise preferences.  Consistent with H2, this study goes further, asserting that 
Beijing is conscious of shifting domestic political trends within target states, including 
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threat perceptions, and adjusts its economic statecraft accordingly.  A follow-on question 
relates to the causal weight of these factors in the decision to exercise coercive lever 
exercise: how does Beijing balance its own threat perceptions of non-allies against 
exacerbating domestic political trends in the target state? 
Interestingly, Kastner and Papayoanou argued in a 1998 study that the U.S. 
should continue engaging China because a high percentage of senior leadership 
benefitted from favorable trade relations (e.g. the pro-growth coalition).  Risk would arise 
if ties deepened enough to limit alternative trade sources or if a pro-China constituency 
within the United States vetoed a balancing response to Chinese belligerence.  Building 
on Hirschman’s case study during the pre-WWI era, they cite Britain’s failure to balance 
Germany in 1914 as a clear example.  In Germany, Junkers and industrialists who were 
willing to risk war overpowered internationalist bankers, who were more concerned with 
maintaining trade ties.  In Britain, internationalists vetoed strategists who wanted to 
contain Germany.  In the Chinese case, “if the balance of power within China begins to 
shift toward inward-looking concerns, a revaluation of the policy of engagement would 
be in order.”83 
This study also draws from recent research on Chinese economic statecraft toward 
the United States that focuses on balance of payments issues (e.g., debt, currency policy, 
trade imbalances).84  Drezner contends that observers exaggerate China’s coercive 
leverage as the Unites States’ largest creditor.  Extensive Chinese interdependence with 
the United States and other economies prevents China from calling in its debts without 
incurring unacceptable financial and political costs.  Here, debt lever exercise becomes 
synonymous with the nuclear weapons logic of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).  
This study concurs with Drezner’s broad assessment, but contends China’s incremental 
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application of the debt lever remains a plausible option for future coercive exercise.85  
Drezner also cautions if the U.S. cannot rein in its own fiscal policy, then “escalating 
U.S. budget deficits might shift the Sino-American financial relationship from mutual 
dependence to asymmetric dependence.”86  This point supports the contention that 
economic exchanges can create forms of asymmetric interdependence with unanticipated 
consequences. 
Kirshner analyzes Sino-American trade imbalances and U.S. protectionist 
pressure against China to revalue to RMB.  Noting Yen revaluation contributed to 
Japanese stagnation since the 1990s, Kirshner predicts RMB revaluation will remain a 
persistent issue in the relationship, primarily because neither side can placate domestic 
and international stakeholders without incurring costs.87  Risk arises, however, if either 
side fails to manage its protectionist coalitions.  Similarly, Blanchard questions whether 
China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and RMB policies reveal coercive intentions.  He 
argues both policies are driven by domestic growth and international prestige, implying 
Chinese economic statecraft pursues these outcomes simultaneously.88  Taken together, 
these sources suggest China’s application of coercive levers in the U.S.-China trade 
relationship is not an immediate threat.  This study argues that while China may not 
deliberately seek asymmetric interdependence with the United States, these capabilities 
develop in stride with economic policies.  This effect increases China’s available levers 
(e.g., debt and RMB levers) without necessarily provoking coercive exercise.  
E. IN SEARCH OF A COERCIVE LEVER PROCESS 
Parsing out a coercive lever process in Chinese economic statecraft poses 
analytical challenges.  Again, a dearth of coercive lever examples exists for analysis, and 
scholars focus mainly on influence effects rather than processes.  This study 
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conceptualizes coercive lever exercise along a spectrum of stages.  First, the asymmetric 
stage outlines conditions of asymmetric interdependence in specific sectors.  These 
sectorial asymmetries depart from the typical pattern outlined by Hirschman in which 
smaller states become dependent on larger states.  Instead, coercive lever application is 
possible even when both states are relatively equal, or when the sending state has a less 
sophisticated economy than the target state.  If both states are relatively equal in terms of 
aggregate economic size, then sectorial asymmetry can tip the balance on the margins, 
creating disproportionate leverage in the affected sector.  If one state has significantly 
more aggregate economic power, sectorial asymmetry can offer the weaker state limited 
coercive leverage.  In this stage, the key decision appoints involve either deliberate 
creation of a specific type of asymmetric interdependence through policy, or the 
opportunistic recognition that sufficient levels of asymmetric interdependence exist in a 
particular sector to make coercive leverage possible.  Identification of coercive levers for 
economic statecraft completes this stage. 
Second, the situational stage covers the opportunities to exercise coercive levers 
created when asymmetric interdependence with international politics converge.  In this 
stage, strategic intent matters less than the political context in which China decides to 
exercise a coercive lever.  That context can involve any international issue area.  China 
could pull, or threaten to pull, a coercive lever over the price of garlic or an 
announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  Pairing levers to objectives is not an 
arbitrary process.  Central-local relations and foreign policy-making trends inform 
domestic preferences.  Management of China’s reputation abroad, the military balance of 
power and economic exchanges shape preferences externally.  As such, this stage 
analyses events that could trigger coercive lever selection and then looks at how China 
matches coercive levers with political objectives as these events unfold.  For example, 
under what circumstances will Beijing decide to exercise a coercive lever in a non-
economic issue area?  What are the transaction costs of exercise?  How long can Beijing 
sustain those costs?  Which factors facilitate explicit exercise in one case, but constrain it 
in another?  How is coercive lever exercise coordinated with other forms of statecraft 
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(e.g., military)?  Selection of coercive levers against a target state along with clear 
political objectives completes this stage. 
Third, the application stage covers how China exercises the coercive lever in 
economic statecraft.  How does a coercive lever fit into the sequence of events in a given 
scenario (e.g., diplomacy first)?  Does the lever support economic objectives, or does it 
crosscut issue areas?  Is the lever explicit or implicit?  How is intent to exercise the lever 
communicated to the target state?  Who decides to exercise the coercive lever and how do 
orders travel from Beijing to the implementation point?  Who are Beijing’s agents in the 
field?  This stage lasts for the duration of the coercive lever exercise.  Fourth, the effects 
stage covers the extent that coercive levers achieve desired outcomes, including changing 
behavior in the target state.  Desired political objectives are the starting point for this 
stage.  Measurement of results comes next.  For example, did exercise of the coercive 
lever accomplish desired political objectives, and if not, why not?  If there were multiple 
objectives, which were met? 
The main focus of this study, however, remains on how coercive levers work in 
economic statecraft, rather than on the effects of those levers.  It follows that asymmetric 
interdependence creates coercive lever capabilities.  Strategic, foreign policy making and 
political economy trends shape preferences.  The nature of bilateral relations with the 
target state affects lever selection, exercise duration and achievable objectives.  
Situational factors driving the international event can trigger the decision to exercise 
levers implicitly or explicitly.  Actual exercise depends on whether a specific lever is 
adequately matched with achievable policy objectives.  Effects depend primarily on the 
target state, but also provide feedback to the sending state.  To the extent possible, this 
study analyzes each of these stages within the cases.  Finally, the study will attempt to 
find discernible patterns of coercion and related circumstances under which China might 
use coercive levers in the future.  This study predicts that as China’s integration with the 
global economy deepens, levers derived from asymmetric interdependence will become 
more prolific, presenting more opportunities for coercive exercise in economic statecraft. 
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III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS GRAND STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter addresses the domestic sources of Chinese economic statecraft from 
both political economy and international relations disciplinary perspectives.  The intent is 
to lay the groundwork for the case studies by addressing the mechanics of economic 
statecraft within China and the structural conditions supporting asymmetric 
interdependence.  This part treats the following basic questions as essential background 
information: How does economic statecraft interact with Chinese grand strategy?  How 
do political economy trends affect China’s capability to employ economic statecraft?  Are 
economic policies with economic statecraft applications coordinated with foreign policy 
objectives?  What are the key issue areas, stakeholders and sectors?  How do 
asymmetries develop and what potential coercive levers evolve with them?   
This chapter also corroborates H1 and H2, which predict that China exercises 
explicit coercive levers rarely based on a range of international and domestic factors.  For 
example, long-term management of international prestige limits explicit exercise to 
reactionary crises, while central-local policy attenuation limits coercive lever capacity.  
In sum, this chapter addresses a key question: why are explicit coercive levers rare?  Part 
of the answer is that along with China’s economic rise, Chinese economic statecraft is a 
relatively new tool of national power.  Beijing wields it conservatively.  Making sense of 
how grand strategy and political economy trends interact with economic statecraft 
requires some essential background on China’s economic rise. 
1. China’s Rise: from Command to “Socialist Market Economy” 
In the years following establishment of the PRC in 1949, China adopted a Soviet-
style command economy to catch up with Western industrialized economies.  A state 
planning system substituted market signals and diverted agricultural surplus to capital-
intensive industrialization and urbanization.89  Initially this input-driven growth worked 
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and China’s GDP reached a respectable eight percent through the 1950s.90  It flattened 
out as the agricultural sector stalled under the strain of increasingly inefficient heavy 
industries.  Growth continued to decline due to a series of policy failures under Mao 
Zedong: millions starved during the autarky of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) 
while the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) turned Chinese society 
upside down.91  At the same time, Cold War geopolitics isolated China from the Western 
economic system; its only trading partner was the Soviet Bloc.  1971–1972 marked a 
watershed as U.S.-China rapprochement and United Nations recognition allowed China 
to begin developing ties with the West and its allies. 
After decades of political upheaval, Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping recognized 
the CCP would not survive unless it could achieve rapid economic development and 
“deliver the goods” to a Chinese population disillusioned by Mao’s ideological 
excesses.92  He successfully wrestled the political initiative from vested elites at the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee held in December 1978 and codified 
this approach with the inauguration of “reform and opening” in 1979.93  From then on in 
the reform era, CCP political legitimacy and regime survivability became intertwined 
with sustaining economic development. 
Sinologists break the reform era into two phases.  The first phase from 1979–1992 
focused on unwinding the Soviet-style command economy by allowing a market sector to 
grow along side the state sector.  This dual-track approach built political stability for 
further reform in the context of persistent bargaining between pro-growth and 
conservative factions.94  Growth occurred “without losers,” since income distribution 
was fairly equitable and living standards rose, particularly in the agricultural sector.  
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Gradual integration with the global economy began in this phase as well, evidenced by 
Chinese membership in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.  Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) in the coastal provinces brought in limited FDI, technology and 
best practices through the establishment of joint ventures with select multi-national 
corporations (MNC). 
The second phase of reform began in 1993.  It marked a key shift in Chinese elite 
politics toward “Big Bang” liberalization as China embraced the forces of globalization 
and export-oriented growth.  This phase followed in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen 
crisis and the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, a highly contested period in Chinese 
politics in which conservative elites almost derailed the reform process.95  Reinvigoration 
of reforms signaled a key political victory for the pro-growth coalition that persists today, 
despite periodic tensions.96  In his last major policy initiative, Deng Xiaoping legitimized 
the shift to accelerated market-liberalization through the policy concept of a “socialist 
market economy.”  Once again, reforms validated the relationship between economic 
development and CCP regime survivability.97  Whereas the first phase sought to nurture 
domestic industries (e.g. import-substitution industrialization), the second phase looked 
increasingly for outward sources of growth.  Domestic policies strengthened rational-
legal governance by eliminating the dual-track system and restructuring the tax, banking, 
state-owned and legal sectors.  Foreign trade reforms promoted Chinese exports and 
recast China as a business-friendly market for foreign investment.  
Integration with the global economy deepened as massive FDI inflows brought 
MNCs, technology and best practices in exchange for access to Chinese labor, component 
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supply chains, and consumer markets.98  Accelerated movement to China was 
underwritten by Chinese guarantees of responsible economic partnership.  This process of 
“opening” culminated with China’s protracted accession to the World Trade Organization 
in December 2001, fifteen years after negotiations began to join the defunct Global 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986.99  Here, past commitments to market-
oriented reforms (e.g., reduction of tariff barriers) became formal obligations in exchange 
for access to international markets.100  According to one analyst, accession went beyond 
opportunistic maximization of trade access; it represented “a comprehensive effort to 
“link up the rails” (jiegui) with the global economic system and to incorporate those 
norms within the domestic system.”101 
Though this phase unleashed new development challenges, such as rising 
inequality and corruption, the combined results of both phases were impressive.  China 
raised hundreds of millions from poverty and sustained an unprecedented growth rate of 
roughly 9.5% for more than thirty years.102  It became East Asia’s primary 
manufacturing hub, integrating value-added supply chains and FDI inflows.  
Interdependence deepened due to rising demand from the EU, U.S. and Japan for Chinese 
exports.  China’s global trade volume grew at a rate of roughly 14% annually, from less 
than one percent of global trade in 1980 to nearly 10% by 2010, when China became the 
world’s second largest economy.103  In sum, China’s economic rise featured two key 
outcomes relevant for this study: the political primacy of economic development based 
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increasingly on integration with the global economy; the opportunities and constraints of 
that development for Chinese economic statecraft. 
B. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY 
Grand strategy is the state orchestration of all national instruments of power as 
means to achieve policy objectives aligned with national interests.  The concept implies a 
degree of coordination between a state’s diplomatic, information, military and economic 
powers, that in practice, is rarely possible.104  Due to China’s deepening economic 
integration with the global economy and its expanding economic exchanges, economic 
statecraft plays an increasingly important role in Chinese grand strategy.   In a foreign 
policy context, these activities support efforts to assuage fears China’s rise reflects 
anything less than “peaceful development” and to manage its global reputation as a 
“responsible major power” that promotes “win-win” cooperation abroad.105  Consistent 
with H1, this section argues China is reluctant to apply explicit coercive levers that might 
undermine core elements of its grand strategy, including international reputation 
management.  Instead, Beijing prefers non-coercive levers primarily, but presumably 
enjoys the flexibility of implicit coercive levers.  This explanation partly addresses why 
examples of explicit coercive levers are relatively rare. 
1. What is Chinese Grand Strategy? 
Given a preference for secrecy and party discipline among PRC leadership, 
divining Chinese grand strategy presents obvious challenges.  Some analysts debate 
whether a Chinese grand strategy exists.106  Over the past decade, transparency improved 
under President Hu Jintao with the routine release of select national policy documents 
(e.g., CCP Politburo meeting reports) and greater participation by Chinese academics in 
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open policy debates.107  For example, Chinese academics often debate the concept of 
comprehensive national power (e.g., “coercive, economic and ideational power”) and 
how China should achieve it in the context of the international balance of power.108  
Compared with the United States, China lacks a comprehensive series of strategic 
documents (e.g., NSS, NDS and NMS).  Augmenting its defense white paper series, 
Beijing came closest to an authoritative grand strategy with the release of its “peaceful 
development” white papers in 2005 and 2011.109  The underlying concept evolved from a 
2002 academic study commissioned by President Hu.  Based on the defunct “peaceful 
rise” concept, peaceful development promoted China’s rise and sought to assuage 
perceptions of the China threat.   
Unsurprisingly, the 2011 “peaceful development” white paper reiterated the 
primacy of economic development in Chinese grand strategy.  “The central goal of 
China’s diplomacy,” it stated, “is to create a peaceful and stable international 
environment for its development.”  This premise, based on more than thirty years of 
economic reforms, is central to both the study of Chinese economic statecraft and the 
relative weight of economic issues in Beijing’s political calculus.  While national defense 
is integral to China’s territorial sovereignty and expanding global interests, it remains 
subordinate to economic development (e.g., last of the “four modernizations”)110 For 
example, despite inflated estimates of the Chinese military budget, its growth rate is 
pegged to GDP growth.111 
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A rough consensus has emerged as scholars pieced together the main features of 
Chinese grand strategy through analysis of rhetoric, official sources and observable 
foreign policy behavior.112  Analysts noted a key strategic shift in the mid-1990s.  
Beijing recognized rising suspicions of Chinese military and economic capabilities (e.g., 
the China threat) would force it to take a more active role in managing international 
perceptions.113  Based on this shift, Avery Goldstein interpreted Chinese grand strategy 
as expanding “international clout without triggering a counter-balancing reaction.”114  
Goldstein describes two supporting components: 1) diplomacy to establish indispensable 
partnerships with major powers 2) campaigns to promote a positive reputation abroad, 
and to suppress pessimistic interpretations of Chinese economic and military capabilities. 
Other important strategic objectives include preserving internal security, maintaining 
territorial sovereignty and reunification with Taiwan.115  Though analysts continue to 
debate whether Beijing aspires regional hegemony, increasing regional influence is a 
reasonable consensus goal that links back to the essential purpose of economic 
statecraft.116  Beijing’s preference for inducements (e.g., influence effects) over coercion 
conforms to the broader strategic shift marked in 1996. 
2. How Does Economic Statecraft Fit In? 
Economic statecraft plays an increasingly important role in Chinese grand 
strategy by facilitating international conditions conducive to sustained economic 
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development and by promoting China as a responsible major power abroad.117 Based on 
limited success with military and political coercion in the 1990s, notably the 1995–6 
Taiwan Straits crisis and 1995 Mischief Reef incident, Beijing has practical reasons to 
prefer inducements.118  According to Adam Segal, economic statecraft advances four 
elements of Chinese grand strategy: 1) assuring resource access, 2) preventing the rise of 
an anti-China coalition, particularly among China’s neighbors, 3) expanding Chinese 
prestige globally, 4) inducing Taiwanese reunification while deterring independence.119  
As noted in chapter I, the first of these elements arises in widely reported examples of 
Beijing’s trade and foreign aid concessions in exchange for access to resources (e.g., oil 
and minerals) in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.120  One analyst calls this 
“resource diplomacy” a “mixed blessing” for Beijing, since it also attracts unwanted 
attention.121  The second and third elements tie directly to limiting the impact of foreign 
policy conflict on economic development and promoting China’s reputation, evidenced 
by the charm offensive in Southeast Asia.  Though the fourth element focuses exclusively 
on Taiwan, the example of Beijing making aid in Africa contingent on explicit 
endorsement of its One China policy demonstrates how an element intertwined with 
Chinese sovereignty travels far outside East Asia. 
Though China’s economic rise began more than thirty years ago, Chinese 
economic statecraft did not play a meaningful role in its grand strategy until the late 
1990s, mirroring the strategic shift noted above.  This finding supports H2 contentions 
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that a lack of experience partly accounts for China’s reluctance to exercise coercive 
levers.  According to Ellen Frost, Beijing was initially hesitant to flex its economic power 
abroad.122  Recognizing the rising value of intra-Asian trade in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, Beijing sought opportunities to deepen regional integration 
beginning with participation in the Chang Mai Initiative on currency swaps.  As part of 
its charm offensive to counter the China threat in Southeast Asia, Chinese-led free trade 
agreements (FTA) proliferated with the ten-year implementation of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - China FTA (ACFTA).  ACFTA signaled China’s 
emergence as an activist economic actor increasingly willing to exercise “commercial 
diplomacy” abroad.123  East Asian states responded to Chinese activism with a mixture 
of opportunism and wariness.124  One analyst suggests these “low quality” FTAs could 
presage an exclusive East Asian trading bloc, threatening U.S. interests in the region.125 
Aware of the international scrutiny accompanying its economic rise, Beijing takes 
great pains to assuage perceptions of the China threat in a target state’s domestic politics, 
especially since those perceptions can spur protectionist policies that threaten Chinese 
export-led growth.126  While China became a net oil importer in 1993, international 
scrutiny of Chinese oil demand spiked in 2004, creating the so-called “China energy 
threat theory.”127  In the United States, protectionist political pressure blocked Chinese 
acquisitions of U.S. oil companies, often fomented by commercial lobbies.  In 2005, a 
Chinese oil company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), withdrew its 
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$18.5 billion bid to acquire Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL).128  If the 
perception of a state-backed acquisition sparked this level of protectionism, then coercive 
levers are even more likely to provoke domestic political backlash.  Consistent with the 
discussion of the Japanese economic threat in U.S. domestic politics in the previous 
chapter, Beijing’s concerns with protectionism are not without justification.  In fact, 
between 2005–7 the U.S. Congress introduced 45 anti-China trade bills.129  Clearly, this 
point corroborates H2, by highlighting the role of target state relations in lever selection.  
The current “economics first, politics later,” approach to cross-Strait relations 
certainly reflects Beijing’s practical shift away from overt forms of coercion.130  It also 
aligns economic statecraft with reunification goals, though results are mixed.131 
Consistent with the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, Beijing has not found an 
effective way to convert economic exchanges into a hard domestic political constraint on 
Taiwan.132  It may exert considerable influence over Taiwanese businesses heavily 
invested in the mainland (e.g., Taishing), but has not achieved consistent political results.  
For example, efforts to leverage Taishing as influence agents in Taiwanese domestic 
politics failed, mainly because Taishing interests did not align neatly with Beijing’s 
reunification goals.133  While maintaining economic exchanges presumably factors into 
Taiwanese policy considerations, the nature of cross-Strait interdependence also limits 
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Beijing’s ability to maintain a coercive political climate.134  As scholar Yong Deng 
notes, “economic integration between Taiwan and Shanghai is probably higher than that 
between any two provinces.”135 
Though Chinese economic statecraft typically revolves around trade and aid 
levers, Beijing has pursued other levers with limited results.  Once again, the relative 
novelty of China’s economic rise partly accounts for Beijing’s reluctance to pursue these 
levers more aggressively.  While Beijing acquired several elements of global economic 
prestige in recent years, these tools did not convey instant expertise.  With unprecedented 
holdings of nearly three trillion dollars in foreign currency reserves, Beijing created the 
China Investment Company (CIC) in 2007, a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to diversify 
Chinese investments abroad.  Multi-billion dollar purchases are complicated transactions 
requiring a level of sophistication firms cannot develop quickly.  As Blanchard notes, 
despite a $300 billion endowment and expectations the CIC could shift the global 
financial balance, it made conservative investments to date.136  The botched UNOCAL 
purchase illustrates an ongoing trend: in 2011 Chinese firms failed to make deals on 
international purchases valued at nearly $39 billion.137  These findings reinforce H2 by 
noting China’s relatively limited experience as a major economic power constrains the 
exercise of certain levers, corroborating H2.  Several analysts argue Beijing’s RMB and 
debt levers do not offer much coercive leverage, though the situation could change.138 
3. Economic Diplomacy or Economic Warfare? 
Analysis of official rhetoric offers additional insight into the relationship between 
economic statecraft and grand strategy.  Three important policy concepts that evolved 
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from the strategic shift of the mid-1990s are “responsible major power,” “win-win 
cooperation,” and “peaceful development.”139  Though none poses a hard constraint on 
Chinese foreign policy behavior, these concepts remain active in Beijing’s official 
lexicon to promote China as a responsible economic actor in the international system.  In 
the early 2000s “economic diplomacy” entered official Chinese discourse, often in the 
context of enhancing economic exchanges with developing nations.  From Baldwin’s 
perspective, this concept inflates the diplomatic role in economic statecraft at the expense 
of more comprehensive statecraft.140  However, Chinese usage is consistent with the 
economic statecraft literature and fits with Beijing’s preference for inducements.  There 
are also signs of official linkage of this concept to Chinese grand strategy.  Following a 
national work congress on economic diplomacy held by the State Council in 2004, a 
People’s Daily editorial - among the most authoritative CCP propaganda tools - noted the 
importance of “strengthening coordination between economy and diplomacy.”141 
The above emphasis on inducements through economic diplomacy contrasts with 
a less authoritative concept of “economic warfare.”  In 1999, two PLA colonels, Qiao 
Liang and Wang Xiangsui, authored a commercial novel titled, Unrestricted Warfare.  
They argued China should pursue non-military forms of war against its adversaries, 
including “smuggling warfare (throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic 
order),” and “economic aid warfare (bestowing favor in the open and contriving to 
control matters in secret).”142  By definition the concept of economic warfare is 
problematic, since using military means to achieve economic ends does not meet the 
criteria of economic statecraft.143  If for example, the PLA employed cyber warfare to 
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attack infrastructure and impose economic costs on the target state, then economic 
warfare would be an appropriate characterization.  There are at least two more problems 
with the legitimacy of this source in the context of Chinese grand strategy.  First, the PLA 
Literature and Arts Publishing House is part of the PLA’s commercial wing; it publishes 
sensationalist books to generate revenue.  Second, the PLA does not play an active role in 
Chinese economic statecraft, which the next section addresses in more detail.  In sum, the 
concept of economic warfare does not appear to hold much weight in Chinese economic 
statecraft, which again supports H1 assumptions that Beijing is reluctant to exercise 
explicit coercive levers that conflict with broader objectives. 
Despite these broad linkages, it remains unclear the extent to which grand strategy 
drives lever exercise during international events.  The next section considers the 
intervening role of international politics and foreign policy making in tempering 
Beijing’s exercise preferences.  For example, though explicit coercive levers are rare, 
there are exceptions over the past decade in which Beijing opted for coercion.  In support 
of H2, the relevant questions are the extent to which lever exercise is sequenced with 
grand strategy objectives and under what circumstances Beijing sees a shift from 
inducements to implicit or explicit coercion as a viable policy option.  In other words, 
how does Beijing weigh transaction costs in economic statecraft?  Consistent with 
Drezner’s work on hidden coercion, this study expects that Beijing exercises implicit 
coercive levers behind closed doors more frequently than evidenced by the public record, 
but lacks sufficient evidence to support this claim.144  Future research could apply game 
theory modeling and perhaps uncover examples of closed-door implicit coercive levers in 
Chinese economic statecraft. 
C. CHINA AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR 
This section frames the interactive relationship between economic statecraft, 
coercive lever preferences and Chinese foreign policy making.  It builds on recent 
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research on China as a less than unitary foreign policy actor. 145  For example, Linda 
Jakobson and Dean Knox note three trends in a 2010 study.146  First, foreign policy 
making may be increasingly contested by the rise of influential stakeholders with diverse 
policy agendas.  For example, Chinese businesses play an increasingly important role as 
actors in Chinese economic statecraft.  Large state-owned enterprises (SOE) in strategic 
industries (e.g., defense, oil) can shape foreign policy preferences on the margins in ways 
that might conflict with Beijing’s interests, pursuing profit at the expense of central 
policy objectives.147  International technological cooperation corporations (IETCC) 
execute infrastructure development projects abroad funded by Chinese foreign aid.  
Operated by provincial governments, IETCCs have a vested interest in promoting these 
initiatives to increase local growth.148 
Second, while economic development remains a consensus priority, China’s pro-
growth coalition may not dominate policy indefinitely.  This finding corroborates Kastner 
and Papayoanou’s 1998 warning that engagement with China could run its course if the 
domestic political balance turns inward.149  Third, advocacy for foreign policy activism 
is gaining traction in response to perceptions the United States and Japan are trying to 
contain China’s rise.  Relatedly, Susan Shirk argues Beijing allows popular expression of 
nationalism in response to foreign policy issues as a domestic political diversion, often 
manifested in sensationalist media reporting and Internet commentary.150  Citing the 
2005 anti-Japan protests as a key example, she argues that when state-sponsored 
nationalism adds a sense of urgency to Beijing’s response to events involving Taiwan, the 
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United States and Japan.151  In fact, Shirk argues that despite the long-term benefits of 
resolving historical grievances and territorial disputes with Japan, Beijing has 
“consistently sacrificed those interests in order to win domestic points for pressing 
symbolic issues.”152  Obviously, this point bears directly on Beijing’s decision-making 
process in the Sino-Japanese case study, but it also suggests the role of public opinion in 
foreign policy making. 
These findings have three relevant implications that suggest coercive levers could 
become more prominent in Chinese economic statecraft due to interactive patterns 
between domestic politics and international crises.  First, in support of H1, foreign policy 
making complicates assumptions of a seamless transition from grand strategy to 
economic statecraft.153 Even though Beijing improved articulation of its grand strategy 
through the increasingly routine release of various white papers, translating guidelines 
into coordinated foreign policy actions poses another problem set.  Several levels of 
stakeholders and issue areas interact in response to international events.  This process 
becomes highly pressurized during periods of international crises in which coercive 
levers are more likely to arise as viable policy options. 
Second, despite a general preference for inducements in economic statecraft, 
reactionary scenarios could trigger Beijing’s decision to exercise coercive levers.  
Candidates include high-stakes international crises that provoke nationalist sentiments, 
such as bilateral incidents with Japan, Taiwan and the United States.  In such cases, 
Chinese leadership would need to balance several competing priorities and choose policy 
options under significant pressure.  Here, international reputation management may 
conflict the domestic political necessity to resolve crises expeditiously.  At a minimum, 
selection of specific levers would depend on available capabilities, the nature of the 
dispute and the bilateral relationship with the target state.  For these reasons, China may 
lack real bargaining power in trade negotiations with more developed countries, because 
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the extension of political concessions might generate domestic costs China cannot afford 
without risking regime stability.154  Here, explicit coercive lever exercise for short 
durations could support achievement of select political objectives by amplifying other 
crisis response efforts or by acting as a viable alternative to military escalation. 
Third, different stakeholders can alter China’s coercive lever preferences through 
domestic political bargaining, and what matters is how shifts in the internal balance of 
power alter domestic policy preferences.155  Managing the inherent tensions between 
achieving economic growth and the threat of market liberalization to Leninist regime 
stability has persisted in elite Chinese politics since the reform era began in 1979.156  If 
for example, the preeminent pro-growth political consensus does unravel among Chinese 
leadership, protectionist pressures could reshape the internationalist path of economic 
reforms and amplify the role of coercive levers in economic statecraft.   
This outcome is not implausible.  A sinologist recently argued if the Chinese 
economy shows signs of a soft landing (e.g., slowed growth without a recession) during 
the anticipated leadership transition in 2012, Chinese domestic politics could become 
increasingly contested and result in an erosion of consensus decision-making.157  The 
frequency of trade wars in specific commodities, like the garlic and tatami mat wars, 
could increase either through Beijing’s initiation or in response to protectionism in other 
states.  Of interest is whether this frequency extends beyond the economic sphere.  
Beijing could impose export sanctions or other types of coercive levers in response to 
disputes across foreign policy issue areas.  This study contends that making the leap 
across issue areas represents a key shift in Beijing’s coercive lever exercise, an argument 
developed further in the next chapter. 
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Several levels participate in Chinese foreign policy making, adding complexity to 
the process of lever selection in economic statecraft during international disputes.  While 
this study is unaware of evidence that specifically describes an economic statecraft 
context, recent research has improved understanding of foreign policy making during 
crises.158  A preference for consensus decision-making drives coordination at the top.  
Here, the CCP general secretary (e.g., Hu Jintao) triple-hatted as the PRC president and 
chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), also chairs the Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC), which is China’s top decision-making body.  Below this level, 
several key advisors, agency representatives and permanent issue teams, known as 
Leading Small Groups (LSG), form ad hoc working groups in response to international 
crises.159  Next, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) automatically establishes smaller 
crisis teams to coordinate with lower level bureaucracies and provide council to the 
PBSC in support of consensus decision-making.160  Based on this general organizational 
outline, important bureaucratic actors in Chinese economic statecraft would include the 
Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), various ministries in Beijing (e.g., MFA, 
MIIT, MOFCOM), provincial government officials and SOEs. 
Participation by other actors and their role in coercive lever selection would 
depend on the issue area and the other states involved.  The role of military influence in 
lever selection occasionally arises in implicit coercive lever examples that do make 
international headlines.  For example, exercise of coercive levers in a Taiwan dispute 
would require coordination with the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), in 
which the PLA is well represented. 161  As noted, Beijing avoids coercive levers in cross-
strait relations (at least explicit ones) and has a shaky record influencing Taiwanese 
domestic politics.  Nor is the PLA, a military tool, in control of economic means, 
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particularly since its 1998 withdrawal from most extra-budgetary sources of income.162  
For that matter, the degree of PLA influence on foreign policy issues remains 
debatable.163  If at all, the PLA could presumably influence desired political objectives 
during a crisis with Taiwan, rather than specific lever selection. 
Interestingly, a group of retired PLA officials affiliated with National Defense 
University (NDU) and the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) commented publicly 
that China should impose sanctions against the United States in response to the 2010 
announcement of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.  According to The Washington Times, 
retired Major General Luo Yuan, affiliated with AMS, argued Beijing should respond by 
“dumping some U.S. government bonds” in a television interview.164  Though think 
tanks like AMS do play an advisory role during crises,165 it is not clear if Beijing 
directed these public comments.  The comparable analogy would be a retired two star 
general critiquing the U.S. response to an international crisis as a military analyst on 
cable television.  This study argues sanctions announced by MFA against U.S. arms 
companies offer a far more credible example of an implicit coercive lever, though Beijing 
apparently did not follow through on this threat.166 
D. POLITICAL ECONOMY TRENDS IN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT  
This section argues that Chinese economic statecraft is both empowered and 
constrained by political economy trends derived from China’s economic rise.167  On the 
one hand, rapid economic growth presents Beijing with opportunities to promote 
influence abroad through economic statecraft.  Accelerated liberalization since the 1990s 
allowed proliferation of levers Beijing is uniquely positioned to exercise due to 
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conditions of asymmetric interdependence with target states.  On the other hand, when 
China’s development challenges combine with strategic and foreign policymaking 
constraints, the options for more aggressive economic statecraft narrow.  As Adam Segal 
notes, “pursuing political objectives at the cost of shorter-term economic goals requires a 
fairly stable and mature economy as well as the ability to balance the demands of 
competing domestic interests.”168  Conditions of asymmetric interdependence might 
buffer aggregate level shortfalls in Chinese economic statecraft, but several situational 
factors must align for coercive lever exercise to become a viable policy option.  Taken 
together, these points suggest Beijing cannot exercise coercive levers effectively if 
economic statecraft objectives conflict with development priorities. 
In many respects, Beijing confronts an apparent embarrassment of riches in its 
economic statecraft due to its transition from command to market economy.  A massive 
market economy governed by a Leninist state might appear to be an incredible advantage 
in economic statecraft.  Prominent among Beijing’s critics, Derek Scissors argues, 
“market reform has died out in China,” due to the Hu-Wen preoccupation with GDP 
growth and market-distorting restructuring efforts.169  According to this view, if the state 
controls strategic economic sectors then it should have less difficulty extracting resources 
and pursuing mercantilist policies abroad.  The persistence of Leninist institutions (e.g., 
nomenklatura) undermines corporate governance and facilitates public-private collusion 
when provincial officials receive CCP appointments as SOE executives based on political 
criteria.170  Backed by the moral hazard of non-performing loans (NPL), Chinese SOEs 
undermine global competition by assuming more risks than market-oriented multi-
national corporations.  Scrutiny of China’s energy strategy and the failed UNOCAL 
purchase are prime example of how this logic affects national perceptions of Chinese 
companies. 
Though not entirely false, the assumption of state primacy loses strength in a 
domestic political context.  Three stages illustrate this point.  First, at an elite level, 
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economic policies are subject to bureaucratic and factional competition in Beijing during 
formation.  Second, policy directives are tempered by devolving central-local relations 
during implementation.171  Here provincial and local officials often ignore central 
directives in pursuit of “growth at any cost,” which accelerated during the second phase 
of reform.172  Third, when polices finally interact with the market, Chinese commercial 
actors may define interests narrowly, further undermining governance through overt and 
subtle forms of non-compliance.173  In fact, commercial actors underwritten by the moral 
hazard of locally issued NPLs typically benefit at the expense of the state, and are hardly 
an asset in Beijing.174  Each of these successive stages cuts away at the assumption of 
central control over the economy.  Several of these patterns share features with foreign 
policy making discussed in the previous section (e.g., elite bargaining).  Individual 
provinces may participate in direct economic exchanges abroad through IETCCs, but 
Beijing still dominates international crisis response.  Both trends corroborate H1 
assumptions that domestic and international factors constrain Chinese economic 
statecraft. 
Despite more than 30 years of unprecedented economic growth, China’s broader 
development challenges prevent it from assuming risk in economic statecraft at the 
expense of other priorities.  Wide development gaps exist between urban and rural areas, 
coastal and inland provinces, and between export and consumer industries.175  Coercive 
lever exercise could widen these gaps in ways that impact development and raise the risk 
of social unrest.  For example, due to Beijing’s emphasis on export-led growth, exporters 
represent China’s most productive industries and are deeply integrated into global 
markets.  If Beijing imposes an export ban on a Chinese-made product, the longer the ban 
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lasts, the greater the risk to commercial profits, family livelihoods, local revenues and 
international market share.  Meanwhile, an import ban could disrupt regional supply 
chains, reducing productivity.  Though the Chinese legal system made great strides 
during the reform-era, the rule of law remains relatively weak with respect to private 
property rights, intellectual property protection and environmental regulatory 
compliance.176  Coercive lever exercise that relies on regulatory compliance at the local 
level will probably stumble during execution.  For example, enterprises may evade an 
export ban by shifting to black market operations.  In sum, Beijing must weigh the costs 
associated with various levers and adjust exercise accordingly in economic statecraft. 
Consistent with H1 and H2, this study argues these trends impose two potential 
limits on coercive lever exercise: 1) the duration of time Beijing can exercise the lever; 2) 
the scope of achievable political objectives.  In theory, the target state bears the brunt of 
coercive lever exercise in economic statecraft, but in practice Beijing remains wary of 
exacerbating domestic tensions that could undermine regime stability.  From Beijing’s 
perspective, economic development challenges increase the likelihood of leadership splits 
at the top and widespread social unrest from below.177  Picking up where the reform era 
discussion left off earlier in this chapter, recentralization initiatives since the 2000s 
reflect renewed policy emphasis on redistributive, sustainable growth.  This shift is 
evident in President Hu’s “scientific development concept” and “new socialist 
countryside.”178  Policies include a new round of SOE sector reforms (e.g., “grasp the 
large, release the small) along with bureaucratic reorganizations (e.g., SASAC, NDRC) to 
improve central oversight and industrial policy implementation.179  These efforts also 
reflect the latest consensus between the pro-growth and conservative coalitions.  
The next section describes China’s dominance of the REE sector the development 
of sectorial asymmetry in the REE sector that allowed Beijing to exercise the REE ban as 
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a coercive lever against Japan.  As the major case in the study, the REE sector receives 
disproportionate attention in this chapter compared with the four mini-cases.  Chapter IV 
describes relevant conditions of asymmetric interdependence for the mini-cases. 
E. CHINA’S RISE IN THE REE SECTOR   
This study highlights two outcomes that evolved as unintended consequences of 
Chinese REE dominance over several decades.  First, sectorial dominance created the 
structural conditions for asymmetric interdependence with Japan, which depends heavily 
on Chinese REE imports (~90%).  Second, this asymmetry contributed a coercive lever to 
Chinese economic statecraft, ultimately exercised in support of limited political 
objectives across issue areas.  Though both outcomes were serendipitous in the context of 
economic statecraft, this study cannot conclude from the evidence that China sought 
dominance of the sector for coercive purposes.  Instead, China’s REE sector developed 
gradually as a consequence of evolving economic policies that began during the 
command economy and continued through the reform era.  Recognition of the strategic 
value of REEs, as an agent of economic growth, dates back to the sector’s 1950s origins. 
Early establishment of an R&D base coupled with industrial policies to stimulate 
the domestic sector over several decades suggest Beijing anticipated the political value of 
REEs as a coercive lever early on.  Whether or not 1950s planners figured this out is 
beyond substantiation, and in some respects, irrelevant to this study.  Certainly, Beijing 
actively pursued REE technologies to promote domestic research and development.   
Production of quality REE-derived products that met international export standards was 
the ultimate goal.  Regardless of when Beijing recognized its potential, the REE lever did 
not develop as a viable policy option until asymmetric interdependence deepened with 
Japan in the years following China’s 2001 WTO accession. 
Based on the early implementation of REE-related economic policies, Beijing 
viewed the REE sector as a strategic industry that supported broader economic 
development priorities.  The REE industrial trajectory approximated China’s progression 
from heavy industry in the command economy to advanced technology in its socialized 
market economy.  Initial growth occurred alongside the steel industry, and in fact REEs 
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were literally a by-product of mined steel ore.  Industrial policies in the 1980s promoted 
domestic mining capacity consistent with import-substitution industrialization (ISI) 
during the first phase of reform.  REE sector trends in the 1990s supported the policy of 
“opening up” in the second phase of reform, including acquisition of best practices from 
foreign MNCs, vertical integration of value-added supply chains and development of 
indigenous innovations.180  Taken together, these policies promoted export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) from component assembly to research and design.  
Recentralization initiatives since the 2000s reflected renewed policy emphasis on 
sustainable growth consistent with President Hu’s “scientific development concept” and 
“new socialist countryside.”181 
1. What are Rare Earths? 
Until the 2010 Senkakus case, rare earths were commonly associated with 
geologists, rather than geopolitics.  Rare earth is actually a misnomer.  In fact many of 
the 17 elements are found in abundant quantities globally, what makes them “rare” is that 
“they are rarely concentrated in mineable ore deposits.”182  While China produces most 
of the global REE supply, REE reserves also exist in the United States, Australia, 
Canada, Brazil, India and South Africa.   Long used as catalysts in heavy and chemical 
industries, REEs are also essential to the manufacture of key components in many 
advanced, dual-use and green technologies from computers to wind powered turbines, 
hybrid car batteries to laser guided bombs.  In sum, REEs are vital to heavy industry and 
to thousands of high technology applications in the global economy.183 
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On the periodic table, REEs are atomic numbers 57–71 along with scandium (21) 
and yttrium (39).  Based on atomic weight, these are divided into light and heavy REEs.  
More abundant are the light REEs, like neodymium, a catalyst widely used in petroleum 
and auto industries, while a heavy REE, like dysprosium, is the primary metal in 
permanent magnets, vital to the miniaturization of electronics.  Extraction and processing 
are costly, both in terms of the potentially low return on investment along with high 
environmental costs.  Many of the waste products are radioactive.  REEs are found in 
mozanite or bastnaesite mixed in with mined ore.  To get at the REE in bastnaesite, for 
example, ore is crushed to gravel, ground to powder and skimmed off the top of treated 
flotation pools.  Acids and solvents then separate various REEs into oxides (REO), which 
are processed into metals and/or refined into alloys for use in high tech applications.  This 
process takes roughly ten days.184  In contrast, it can take roughly ten years from 
discovery of an REE source before mining is possible.185  
2. How did China Dominate the Global REE Supply Chain?  
China’s REE industry predates the PRC to the 1927 discovery of REE reserves in 
Baotao, Inner Mongolia.  Extraction began in the 1950s with the recovery of REE-
enriched bastnaesite ore as a byproduct of iron ore mining.  Today the industry accounts 
for about 95% of global mining and oxide production along with approximately 50% of 
known reserves, about 55 million tons.186  Its Bayan Obo mine in Baotao is the world’s 
largest producer, though there are more than 100 enterprises scattered across nearly all of 
China’s 22 provinces.  Recognizing the industrial value of REEs as a catalyst, a research 
and development (R&D) base followed with establishment of the General Research 
Institute for Nonferrous Metals (GRINM) in 1952 and the Baotou Research Institute of 
Rare Earths in 1963 (BRIRE).  The sector could not progress beyond the mining phase of 
the supply chain until engineers developed an indigenous REE separation capability at 
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BRIRE in the 1970s.  In that case, a Columbia-trained nuclear chemist, Xu Guangxian, 
successfully applied his research in uranium isotope extraction to rare earth extraction.187 
Production took off during the first phase of reforms (1979-1992), as industrial 
policies stimulated the domestic mining sector.  During this period, productivity grew 
from 1,000 tons in 1978 to 11,860 tons in 1986.188  That same year, the Bayan Obo mine 
surpassed its primary global competitor, the U.S.-owned Mountain Pass mine in 
California.189  In the second phase of reform (since 1992), the sector acquired strategic 
significance and REEs became a protected strategic mineral.  Though probably 
attributable to industrial mythology, Deng Xiaoping supposedly visited the Bayan Obo 
mine in 1992 as part of his famous Southern Tour and declared: “The Middle East has 
oil, and China has rare earths.”190  That year, China’s Ministry of Land Reform (MLR) 
prohibited foreign companies from mining or smelting REEs on Chinese soil unless they 
became joint ventures with Chinese enterprises.191  A decade later in 2002, China’s 
National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) issued temporary guidelines: 1) 
forbidding foreign companies from mining REEs in China; 2) encouraging foreign and 
joint ventures to invest in value-added REE production.192   
As Chinese exports permeated the global market in the 1990s, the previously 
dominant U.S. REE industry collapsed due to falling prices and the domestic costs of 
environmental regulatory compliance.  The U.S. REE mining industry limped along until 
2002 when the sole-sourced Mountain Pass mine located in California shut down.193 
From then on, the United States became a net REE importer, joining Japan, South Korea, 
Germany and France.  With a near global monopoly, Chinese production soared, and 
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reached approximately 130,000 tons of REEs in 2010.  Global demand was 
approximately 134,000 tons, of which China’s domestic demand was nearly 60%.194  
Just as rising energy demands transformed China to a net oil importer in the mid 1990s, 
experts predict domestic REE demand could overtake domestic production in the short 
term.195  In other words, like its global importers, China is increasingly dependent on its 
REE sector to meet rising domestic demands, undermining the long-term viability of 
REEs as a coercive lever. 
Steady growth of Chinese REE demand reflects four underlying trends.  First, 
China uses massive quantities of light REEs as catalysts in heavy chemical and steel 
industries, which remain strategic sectors in the Chinese economy.  Second, Beijing’s 
industrial policies created financial incentives for foreign companies to move value-
added manufacturing facilities to China.  Increasingly, foreign manufacturing firms that 
make REE oxides, alloys and components (e.g., SmCo permanent magnets) steadily 
migrated there to take advantage of cheap labor and relatively lax environmental 
standards.  Several are Japanese-owned, which began leaving Japan over the 1980s and 
1990s due to falling REE prices and environmental concerns.196  This trend accelerated 
following China’s 2001 WTO accession and the apparent business confidence this 
achievement inspired in the Chinese market climate.  These policies support domestic 
movement up the REE value-added supply chain. 
Third, and relatedly, Beijing’s REE export regime employed export quotas and 
value added taxes to shape REE prices and enhance domestic financial incentives.197  
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issues quotas to 31 authorized REE exporters, 
who may trade quotas as commodities, effectively selling the right to export REEs by the 
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ton.198  Between 2005 and 2011, China reduced export quotas by 54% from a high of 
65,000 tons to 30,300 tons.  It kept the same quota in 2012.199  Though raising concern 
among foreign REE importers, these industrial polices contributed to a global REE price 
boom over the same time period.  Interestingly, this boom enhanced the business case for 
foreign companies to invest in REE reserve exploration outside China.200  Contrary to 
the expectation of massive profits due to state intervention, Chinese enterprises have not 
benefitted from rising international market prices.  As Yufan Hao and Weihua Liu note, 
“the export price of neodymium oxide is only about $200,000 per ton, whereas the re-
export price of the purified neodymium produced by foreign companies is as high as 
$200,000 per kg.”201 
Fourth, China’s domestic REE enterprises are maturing after more than 60 years 
of experience and intellectual capital invested in the industry, a significant development 
given the role of REE-based components in dual-use and green technologies.  In contrast 
with the low value-added characteristic of Chinese advanced electronics assembly, the 
Chinese REE sector may represent an indigenous industry in which China could 
eventually tilt the R&D balance in its favor.202  The sector gradually climbed the supply 
chain from mining, separation and refining to alloying and manufacturing components.  
Though China still lags behind the United States and Japan in the latter, the gap narrowed 
in 1995 when China purchased a U.S.-owned samarium cobalt (SmCo) permanent 
magnet company called Magnaquench and shifted all production to China by 2002.203  
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Since then, China became the leading supplier of permanent magnets, which make 
computers smaller, spin modern windmills and shift the fins on laser guided bombs.204 
In sum, by dominating the global REE industry China steadily acquired more 
knowledge over time than the competition.  This accumulation facilitated the domestic 
sector’s vertical movement up the value-added supply chain from REE mining to REE-
derived component manufacture.205  In addition to GRINM and BRIRE, there are two 
state-run laboratories: the Rare Earth Materials Chemistry and Applications lab affiliated 
with Peking University and the Rare Earth Research Utilization lab affiliated with the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences.  The Chinese Society of Rare Earths publishes the only 
REE dedicated journals globally.206  An informed reader perusing volume 29, issue one 
of the 2011 Journal of Rare Earths, would find esoteric titles like, “Synthesis, crystal 
structures and characterization of a pair of TbIII-based enantiomers.”  Though foreign 
scientists consume this information, Chinese scientists research much of the content. 
Despite the strengths of Chinese REE industry, it faces many of the same 
development challenges discussed earlier in this chapter (e.g., growth at any cost).  As 
with other sectors, these challenges undermine central efforts to consolidate the REE 
industry in ways aligned with broader economic development goals.  In the context of 
economic statecraft, these challenges also raise the transaction costs associated with 
coercive exercise of the REE lever.  The next sections specify development challenges in 
the REE industry and Beijing’s efforts to rein them in. 
3. Why China’s Grip on the REE Industry is not a Sure Thing 
The REE industry faces several development challenges that undermine Chinese 
dominance from overcapacity and environmental degradation to illegal mining and 
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smuggling.207  Overcapacity prevents Beijing from controlling its reserves and ensuring 
domestic demands are met.  Multiple environmental impacts undermine sustainable 
growth, both in terms of rehabilitation and regulatory compliance costs.  Many smaller 
enterprises are inefficient, ill equipped and marginally profitable (~1–5%).  Illegal 
mining and smuggling operations further siphon REE profits away from China’s balance 
sheet to black markets.  As with energy demand, China’s domestic REE demand 
continues to grow, meaning China will look increasingly abroad for REE supplies.  On 
the one hand, these outcomes undermine the assumption of state-control over the REE 
sector, potentially constraining Beijing’s exercise of the REE lever.  On the other hand, 
Beijing launched multiple regulatory and consolidation initiatives to address the above 
challenges.  It is unlikely development of economic statecraft capabilities motivated 
Beijing’s recentralization efforts. 
Most of these challenges arose in the context of devolving central-local relations 
during the second phase of reform.  Known as “growth at any cost,” central policies 
encouraged local officials to promote local commercial sectors, provided they could 
sustain a high growth rate.  Given considerable latitude to implement central guidance, 
local officials overlooked environmental, safety and licensing regulations, “to avoid 
facing the dangers from job losses and decreased revenue, including social unrest, 
destabilization and possible demotion.”208  In the REE sector, deregulation of the mining 
industry allowed scores of “small scale and technologically backward mines and 
separation plants” to acquire REE licenses easily.  This overcapacity stemmed from a 
1981 central policy, called Let Water Flow Rapidly, “to stimulate no holds-barred mining 
developments to meet a rapid spike in resource demand without appropriate 
considerations of environmental protection, safety and sector consolidation.” 209  A 1985 
export tax rebate accelerated the number of new REE mining enterprises, often equipped 
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with archaic technology.210  As a result, Beijing did not exercise much control over the 
sector’s production capacity or regulatory compliance. 
 Persistent environmental and public health risks plague the Chinese REE sector, 
raising the prospects for social unrest in the surrounding populations.  Because REE 
refinement requires copious amounts of chemical solvents, production of every ton of 
REEs generates approximately 29 pounds of dust, 420,000 cubic feet of gas, 2600 cubic 
feet of wastewater, and one ton of radioactive waste.  Wastewater routinely seeps into 
rivers and streams, while poor air quality afflicts many REE mining towns.  The 
townspeople drink contaminated water and breathe carcinogenic air.  In 2009 there were 
5,387 cases of black lung in Baotao alone. 211  Despite difficulty enforcing regulations at 
the local level, Beijing cannot afford to ignore the social risks of environmental 
damage.212  
None of the above environmental risks is unique to China.  As REE facilities 
shutdown worldwide due to environmental and regulatory costs, China’s REE sector 
expanded in the context of “growth at any cost.”  On the one hand, lax regulations 
allowed Chinese REE companies to produce at approximately one third the cost of 
foreign competitors.213  On the other hand, foreign companies benefitted from access to 
cheap REEs from China, alleviating the need to invest in REE mining and exploration.  
In this respect, industrial critiques of China’s dominance are somewhat dubious: other 
REE reserves exist, but further exploration and extraction have not been profitable given 
high transaction costs.  In an interview with Lluís Fontboté, economic geologist at the 
University of Geneva, the trade publication Earth noted, “many published estimates of 
world mineral reserves actually reflect fluctuations in the market for a mineral, and thus 
in a country’s or company’s eagerness to invest in exploration for that mineral, rather 
than geological realities.”214 
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In addition to supply-side efforts to influence global REE prices, illegal mining 
and smuggling operations in Southern China are major drivers of government efforts to 
control exports.  While the Bayan Obo mine sits on more than 80% of China’s REEs, 
most are the more common light variety.  In contrast, nearly all 1.5 million tons of known 
heavy REEs (~2.7%) reside in Southern China where operations run by crime syndicates 
reduced China’s mineable resources and drove prices down through cutthroat 
competition.  The problem is clearly evident in Guangdong province, in which official 
production in 2008 was 2,553 tons, compared with an actual output estimated at between 
25–30k tons.215  In other words, only 10% of Guangdong’s REE exports made it to 
China’s balance sheet. 
4. Polluters, Illegal Miners and Smugglers Need Not Apply  
Consistent with broader recentralization initiatives, Beijing issued new guidance 
in the late 2000s to rein in regulatory control from local officials.  The main thrust 
involved consolidating larger operations and cracking down against illegal mines.  A 
2008 restructuring plan outlined consolidation of all 100 REE enterprises into 20 
companies organized under three regional districts by 2015.  These were the northern 
district (Inner Mongolia and Shandong), the western district (Sichuan) and the southern 
district (Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan and Guangxi).  Meanwhile, Beijing’s leading 
agency over REEs, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), would 
conduct planned and spot inspections to ensure regulatory compliance.  In 2008, state-
owned Baotao Steel created the Inner Mongolia Baotao Steel Rare Earth High-Tech Co. 
as the national REE commercial hub.216  Following Japan’s lead, which began 
stockpiling decades ago, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) recently ordered 
Inner Mongolia Baotao Steel Rare Earth (Group) to build ten REE storage facilities.217 
In the southern provinces, consolidation and regulatory measures specifically 
targeted illegal REE operations, overcapacity and ineffective local governance.  Again, 
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this region matters since it contains the vast majority of medium and heavy REE reserves.  
Reorganization in Jiangxi began in 2008 with the establishment of the China Minmetals 
Rare Earth Co., headquartered in Ganzhou City.  In 2009, MLR attempted to regain 
control of limited heavy REE resources by suspending issuance of mining and survey 
licenses.218  In 2011, MLR took direct control over 11 REE mining districts in Jiangxi, 
stripping administrative oversight from the provincial and local level.219  Guangdong 
Rising Nonferrous Metals Group Co, became the only legal mining company in 
Guangdong province.220  Central sponsored SOEs have met local resistance.  For 
example, state-owned companies such as China Minmetals Corp. and Aluminum 
Corporation of China (Chinalco) pushed to enter the Jiangxi Province market (rich in 
heavy rare earth deposits, especially in Ganzhou), but found that the local Ganzhou Rare 
Earth Minerals Industry Co. Ltd. had a monopoly over licensing.221 
New environmental standards emerged in 2009 with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection’s (MEP) issuance of the Rare Earth Pollutant Discharge 
Standards.  This initiative established standards for six types of airborne and 14 types of 
waterborne pollutants.  Given that regulatory compliance could cost an additional 145 to 
220 dollars per ton of REE produced, Chinese companies will have difficulty absorbing 
the required overhead without assistance from Beijing.222  Since no such environmental 
regulations existed for the REE sector previously, REE operators were not technically 
guilty of noncompliance.  This clean slate ended when implementation took effect in 
2011.  In November that year, MEP announced the results of its first environmental 
compliance inspections of 84 REE companies in 14 provinces, noting that submission of 
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environmental impact assessment reports was a prerequisite for legal mining 
operations.223 
F. CONCLUSION 
Scholarly analysis of China’s REE industry and the 2010 embargo is relatively 
scarce.  In one of the few academic sources to treat China’s REE sector, Robert Looney 
tentatively concludes China’s global REE dominance may reflect a policy shift away 
from market-driven growth to technocratic retrenchment, which he dubs “a new 
technocratic mercantilism.”224  Approaching the sector from an energy security 
perspective, Mikkal Herberg cautions Chinese REE dominance exacerbates East Asian 
“import dependence for critical energy and industrial inputs.”225  More recently, in a 
National Bureau of Asian Research study edited by Herberg, Yufan Hao and Weihua Liu 
argue that misperception informs foreign observations of China’s REE industry. 
Apparently protectionist policies are driven primarily by domestic politics, rather than an 
interest in global domination.226  Jane Nakano argues that regardless of Chinese 
intentions, the 2010 REE suspension, “dealt a detrimental blow to Japanese perceptions 
of China as a reliable economic partner.”227 
In sum, this study did not find sufficient evidence indicating Beijing developed 
the REE sector specifically for coercive exercise in economic statecraft.  Instead, Beijing 
promoted the sector to support economic development priorities based on the prominent 
role of REEs in heavy industries and advanced technologies.  Certainly Beijing sought 
the technological value of REEs.  To these ends, Beijing pursued industrial policies that 
set prices and lured foreign companies to China to acquire best practices and technology.  
Though this state intervention was arguably protectionist, enhancing domestic 
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productivity and global competitiveness were the goals.  Beijing’s strategic minerals 
designation, export regime and prohibition against foreign companies from REE mining 
certainly fomented suspicions of mercantilism.  Conscious of its WTO obligations, 
Beijing asserts its export restrictions are within compliance and that industrial regulations 
apply to the domestic sector as well.  Of course, these measures are documented in a 
WTO complaint filed by the United States, the EU and Japan in March 2012.228  Though 
wary of protectionism, foreign REE companies continue to move to China to take 
advantage of incentives and increased REE profits.  Meanwhile, rising REE prices 
hastened the business case for a resurgence in global REE exploration, benefitting the 
industry in the long term. 
Perhaps new environmental regulations cover Beijing’s mercantilist retrenchment.  
More likely this trend reflects broader recentralization efforts to manage the deleterious 
effects of “growth at any cost.”  Though in recent years Beijing made great strides in 
environmental regulatory policy, lax enforcement at the local level remains a 
challenge.229  Here, Beijing cannot ignore the environmental costs of unregulated REE 
activities without risking unacceptable levels of social unrest, and therefore, regime 
survivability.230 Though the temptation to project an intentional 60-year coercive lever 
development strategy on Beijing may be an appealing prospect, this study cannot make 
that claim.  Recognition of the value of REEs as a potential coercive lever probably 
occurred over the past decade as movement of Japanese REE companies to China 
accelerated in the wake of WTO accession.  This movement deepened conditions of 
asymmetric interdependence in the REE sector and ultimately provided Beijing with a 
coercive lever.  The lever remained latent until 2010 when a bilateral dispute escalated 
into an international crisis.  Only then did Beijing decide to exercise it coercively to 
advance policy objectives against Tokyo. 
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IV. REE EMBARGOS MAKE WAVES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case study involves Beijing’s suspension of rare earth element (REE) 
shipments to Japan in response to a 2010 maritime crisis in disputed waters near the 
Senkakus Islands in the East China Sea.231  This study argues Beijing’s imposition of the 
two-month REE embargo was an example of explicit coercive lever exercise, that in 
concert with diplomatic and propaganda campaigns, achieved short-term political 
objectives.  Given Beijing’s preference for inducements outlined in the previous chapter, 
the immediate question is why did Beijing shift to coercion in this case?  How did it 
exercise the lever?  What did it hope to achieve?  If this study adopted Paul Krugman’s 
explanation from the opening vignette in chapter I, then there would be little reason for 
this case study.  Beijing simply revealed its true colors; the market-oriented reforms of 
the past thirty years were a sham. 
Yet, there can be little doubt that coercive lever exercise conflicted with Beijing’s 
efforts to promote China as a responsible major power abroad.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, reputation management is a core element of Chinese grand strategy in 
which economic statecraft plays an increasingly important supporting role.  At the same 
time, as with other examples of Chinese foreign policy behavior, coercive lever exercise 
is subject to diverse interpretations.  The obvious contrast is the example of Beijing’s 
participation in multi-lateral sanctions against North Korea raised in chapter I.  In that 
case, coercive exercise was associated with upholding status quo norms, and therefore, 
lauded by the international community.  Here again, some observers would like to see 
less Chinese economic statecraft; others would like to see more. 
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While the episode could mark a shift in Beijing’s preferences towards more 
frequent coercive lever exercise, the more plausible explanation is that this was a rare 
case under extreme conditions in which coercive lever exercise became a viable policy 
option.  This explanation is consistent with H1 predictions.  If correct, there are two 
corollaries.  First, exercise of the lever demonstrated a rising level of sophistication in 
Chinese economic statecraft.  As predicted by H2, Beijing cannot yet pursue coercive 
lever exercise in support of long-term policy objectives particularly when exercise 
conflicts with strategic or economic development priorities.  Short-term objectives are 
within its grasp.  Second, Beijing demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to link 
coercive lever exercise across economic and security objectives during an international 
crisis.  It is reasonable to expect that under similar circumstances, Beijing could exercise 
coercive levers again as a policy option.  This outcome merits monitoring the indications 
of Beijing’s coercive lever exercise future international crises. 
Coercive lever exercise followed the process of stages outlined in chapter II: 
asymmetric, situational, application and effects.  First, China and Japan are near peer 
economic competitors; conventional Hirschmanesque logic does not apply to Sino-
Japanese relations.  While China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy in 2010, 
trade relations remain relatively balanced, and Japan’s per capita GDP is much larger.  
Because Japan depends exclusively on China for REE imports, while China can diversify 
its exports, asymmetric interdependence exists in the REE sector.  This sectorial 
asymmetry was sufficient for Beijing to exercise the REE embargo as a coercive lever. 
Beijing’s imposition of the REE embargo was not part of a trade war in response to a 
similar action by Tokyo.  Its trigger was not economic.  Instead, the embargo arose in the 
context of an ongoing bilateral security dispute.  
Consistent with research by Papayoanou, Kastner, Kahler, Drezner, Segal and 
Shirk, this study argues the escalatory nature of the 2010 flare-up in the Senkakus dispute 
emboldened Beijing to make two key decisions in the situational stage: 1) it could assume 
the risk of coercive lever exercise as a viable policy option, 2) it could pursue short-term 
political objectives with limited expectations of success.  Additionally, three factors 
informing Beijing’s calculus were the persistence of “cold politics, hot economics” in 
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Sino-Japanese relations, anti-Japanese nationalism in China, and heightened perceptions 
of the China threat in Japan.  Here, Beijing’s expectation of future conflict with Japan as 
a non-allied target state certainly met the criteria of Drezner’s sanctions paradox.  
Interestingly, Beijing was more successful than Drezner might predict.  Meanwhile, on 
the Japanese side, Papayoanou, Kahler and Kastner’s warnings over the need to stay 
abreast of shifts in the domestic political balance within China proved significantly 
resonant in this case. 
The way the crisis unfolded in the situational stage also shaped transaction costs 
among policy options, affecting Beijing’s decision to exercise the REE lever coercively.  
Compared with past flare-ups in the Senkakus Islands and East China Sea, the 2010 
Senkakus dispute escalated rapidly and pressurized Beijing’s crisis response apparatus.  
In this flare-up, Beijing confronted the convergence of what Shirk might have called a 
perfect nationalist storm.  Nationalism added a sense of urgency and conflict that 
exacerbated tensions among foreign policy stakeholders.  Hardliners probably pushed for 
coercive measures that would signify Beijing’s protest and resolve.  Drawing on Ross and 
Segal, since the balance of military power still favored Japan and its ally the United 
States, Beijing’s coercive options were scarce.  Coercive lever exercise arose as a feasible 
escalatory tactic that fell short of military force.  As this case study will show, Beijing 
pursued several coercive policies simultaneously, in which coercive lever exercise played 
an integral role. 
Interaction between grand strategy, foreign policy making and political economy 
trends shaped events in the application stage.  Coercive exercise was a clear departure 
from Beijing’s preference for inducements in economic statecraft.  Because the pro 
growth coalition remained concerned with China’s international reputation as a economic 
partner, Beijing did not exercise the lever officially or for a prolonged period of time.  It 
is also possible the pro-growth coalition grew concerned prolonged exercise could impact 
development priorities.  Though dubious, this approach offered a modicum of plausible 
deniability to China’s top leaders in the context of its WTO accession protocol.  From the 
center, Beijing exercised the lever by imposing uniform export restrictions on all 31 
authorized REE exporters in China.  At the provincial level, customs officials prevented 
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ships loaded with REE exports bound for Japan from leaving the pier, but allowed ships 
to get underway for other destinations.  Tactics included increased customs clearance 
inspections on air and ship cargo.  Though Beijing repeatedly denied ordering the ban at 
all levels, exercise was explicit based on Japanese industry and government reports that 
showed marginal levels of Chinese REE exports to Japan during the two-month embargo. 
By exercising the REE coercive lever, Beijing sought three short-term political 
objectives that targeted Tokyo and the Japanese REE industry.  First, signaling resolve 
and amplifying Beijing’s official protest against Tokyo in the context of ongoing 
territorial and maritime disputes.  Second, contributing to release of the Chinese captain, 
effectively ending the crisis.  Third, coercive lever exercise also targeted the Japanese 
REE industry to commence a third wave of migration.  In contrast with past efforts to 
lure REE business through market-oriented incentives, Beijing opted for coercion in this 
case.  It sent a clear signal to Japanese companies that China could disrupt unrefined REE 
supplies, hastening relocation of some Japanese-owned REE manufacturers to China.  
For China’s domestic REE industry, exercise supported vertical integration of the value-
added supply chain.  Wary of the disruptive effects of prolonged exercise on development 
priorities, Beijing viewed coercive exercise as a temporary tactic. 
Effects of the REE embargo continue to unfold.  China made little headway 
toward resolving its bilateral disputes with Japan in the Senkakus and East China Sea, 
though this outcome matched Beijing’s short-term objectives.  Instead, Beijing’s three-
pronged response to the crisis exacerbated nationalist sentiments on both sides, pushed 
Japan closer to the U.S.-Japan security alliance and raised Japanese perceptions of the 
China threat.  Multinational state and commercial efforts commenced to diversify global 
rare earth sources.  More than 18 months after the episode, the United States, Japan and 
the European Union (EU) filed a WTO complaint against Chinese REE export 
restrictions in March 2012, undermining China’s compliance with its 2001 accession 
protocol.  This chapter discusses key events during the crisis timeline and briefly covers 
the Sino-Japanese disputes in the Senkakus and East China Sea.   Next, it examines how 
China applied the coercive lever mechanism in greater detail.  Finally, this chapter 
concludes with sections on commercial and state responses to the REE embargo. 
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B. A THREE-PRONGED RESPONSE TO DETENTION OF CAPTAIN ZHAN 
1. Background 
Though punctuated by a status quo of “cold politics, hot economics,”232 Sino-
Japanese relations deteriorated in September 2010 following a maritime crash near the 
Senkaku island chain in the East China Sea, where both sides have unresolved territorial 
and maritime claims.  On September 7, a Chinese fishing vessel underway in Japan’s 
claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships 
near one of the Senkaku Islands, which Japan has administered since 1972.233  Tokyo 
broke with the established pattern of escorting unauthorized vessels outside of its EEZ 
and deporting their crews.  Instead, it detained the fishing vessel’s Chinese crew, 
including its captain, and commenced legal procedures under Japanese domestic law.  
This deviation from the status quo escalated the crisis to another level.  It confounded 
Beijing and intensified nationalist pressures on both sides, creating ideal conditions for 
coercive lever exercise. 
Given the likelihood of future conflict in Sino-Japanese relations, China’s official 
response was swift, persistent, and resolute.  On September 8, Beijing issued a protest 
demanding the crew’s release with Ambassador Niwa Uchiro, who was just shy of his 
second month as Japanese ambassador to China.  The next day, Beijing sent a Fishery 
Administration vessel to patrol the disputed area, reportedly to protect its fishermen.  
Midnight September 11, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo demarched Ambassador 
Niwa yet again.  In response to ramped-up pressure, Japan released the 14-member crew 
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and vessel on September 13, but in an unusual move, it kept Captain Zhan Qixiong in 
detention on Okinawa.234 
Coercive lever exercise arose as a component of China’s three-pronged response 
to the crisis, initially dominated by aggressive diplomatic and information campaigns.  
By mid-September, the diplomatic lines were essentially fixed.  China argued Japan 
detained the crew and ship illegally, and called for the immediate release of Captain 
Zhan.  Japan argued the vessel’s fishing activities were illegal in Japanese waters, and 
that the ship obstructed Japanese authorities by ramming the Coast Guard ships.  As such, 
the Ishigaki court on Okinawa would decide the matter.  China’s propaganda apparatus 
amplified diplomatic pressure through state-run and commercial media outlets.  For 
example, a China Daily article linked the deteriorating health of Captain Zhan’s family 
members with his continued detention by Japanese authorities.235  Beijing applied the 
same tactic during the 2001 U.S. EP-3 collision with a Chinese F-8 near Hainan Island.   
Over the next two weeks, China suspended diplomatic exchanges, allowed small-
scale anti-Japan protests and arrested four Japanese construction workers in Hebei 
province, located in northern China.  On September 20, the Ishigaki court on Okinawa 
extended Captain Zhan’s detention until at least September 29.  The next day, Beijing 
announced Premier Wen would not meet with Prime Minister Kan at the United Nations 
General Assembly in New York scheduled that week, though Japanese Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Sengoku had already made similar comments.  In fact, during an event in New 
York, Prime Minister Wen warned, “if Japan clings to its course, China will take further 
action.”236  Though a Hu-Wen meeting did not occur at UNGA, on September 23 
Foreign Minister Maehara did meet with Secretary of State Clinton, who reaffirmed the 
U.S.-Japan security alliance applied to the Senkakus.237  U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen made the 
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same affirmation at a press conference.  As these responses played out publicly, coercive 
lever exercise evolved on the margins.  
Both the diplomatic and information campaigns were clearly coercive.  Short of 
military intervention, negative transaction costs were largely sunk costs.  From an 
economic statecraft perspective, making the shift from inducements to coercion was not 
much of a leap under the circumstances.  Indications of coercive lever exercise emerged 
on or about September 23, when Japanese industry executives alleged that Chinese 
customs officials were halting outbound REE shipments to Japan.  Ships loaded with 
REE containers remained tied to the pier.  This widely reported event appeared to alter 
the calculus in Tokyo.  At the same time, U.S. reassurances at UNGA presumably 
influenced Japan to expedite resolution to the crisis.238  Initially vowing to prosecute the 
captain in the Ishigaki court on Okinawa, Tokyo backed down instead.  Subsequent 
release of the Chinese captain on September 24 did not ease tensions immediately.  
Beijing demanded an apology, and rejecting that, Tokyo demanded compensation for 
damages to its Coast Guard ships.239  Meanwhile in Japan, Prime Minister Kan’s 
approval rating dropped 10% and Japanese headlines proclaimed “diplomatic defeat.”240  
The captain’s release did not end REE suspension either.  As the first week of the 
embargo continued, mixed reports from industry sources indicated a spike in customs 
clearance inspections in several Chinese provinces.  In Shanghai, Japanese trading houses 
reported imposition of 100% “sample inspection” rates of outbound REE shipments by 
Chinese customs agencies.  Air cargo “quarantine inspections” of electronics with REE 
components also increased from 10%–50%.  Reports cited similar activity in Fujian, 
Guangdong and Liaoning Provinces.241  China produces roughly 95% of the global 
supply of REE exports and Japan depends on China for roughly 85% of its REE imports.  
In an interview with The Japan Times, a Japanese REE importer, Kanmaterial Corp. 
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Chairman Katsuyuki Matsuo, summed up this asymmetry succinctly, "it is no 
exaggeration to say that Japan is the only country inconvenienced by restrictions on 
Chinese exports of rare earths."242  A September 29 Yomiuri Shimbun editorial cited the 
REE embargo as a call to reverse the course of manufacturing to China over the past 
decade: “Japanese companies should take this opportunity to reconsider their business 
strategy of concentrating production centers and investment in China, and instead start 
exploring new markets as the first step to reducing business risks.”243 
The crisis exacerbated nationalist sentiments on both sides.  Consistent with 
Shirk’s research on state-sponsored nationalism involving international incidents with 
Japan, Beijing allowed anti-Japan protests in several provinces over multiple days.  Anti-
Japan protests occurred in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Xian and Zhengzhou from 
October 16–18 and again from October 23–25.  Like suspension of the 2005 anti-Japan 
protests after three weeks, there were limits to Beijing’s acquiescence.  Chinese police 
prevented protests from resuming during the Asian Games in Guangzhou.244  
Meanwhile, Japanese public opinion matched perceptions of the China threat among the 
business community.  A Sankei Shimbun and Fuji Network spot survey found that 71.5% 
of Japanese respondents viewed China as a threat.245  Meanwhile, a Yomiuri Shimbun 
telephone survey found that 85% of Japanese respondents did not trust China based on 
the way Beijing handled the crisis.246  
The Chinese military was conspicuously absent throughout the crisis, suggesting 
Beijing was unwilling to risk a possible military confrontation with Japan, and of course, 
the United States.  Dispatch of at least two Fishery Administration vessels in September 
and October did not represent a military response.  Designated to patrol Chinese-claimed 
EEZs since 2009, Fishery Administration vessels are not part of the People’s Liberation 
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Army Navy (PLAN) and ultimately report to the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command 
(FLEC), under the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing.247  There is little evidence PLA 
officials pressured their civilian counterparts to exercise the REE lever coercively, or that 
the military set the coercive tone of Beijing’s response.  Instead, PLA representatives 
probably fulfilled advisory and intelligence support roles as participants in formal 
organizations (e.g., FALSG) and in ad hoc crisis response groups.248 
Though the REE embargo continued for nearly two months, Chinese officials at 
all levels repeatedly denied ordering it, including Premier Wen Jiabao.  Japanese officials 
made little headway in negotiations.249  Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry 
(METI) Minister Okata Akihiro urged Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Yaping to 
resume REE shipments during a late October meeting in Tokyo.  Initiated by the 
Japanese side, diplomatic relations began thawing on the margins of the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) in Hanoi.  Separate meetings occurred between both Foreign Ministers 
and between Premier Wen and Prime Minister Kan on October 30.  The next month, a 
brief Kan-Hu meeting occurred during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Yokohama on November 13.  Both Foreign Minister Yiang Jiechi and Premier 
Wen denied the embargo existed and stressed China would continue to supply REEs to 
Japan. 
When the REE embargo did end, on or about November 20, there was no press 
conference in Beijing.  Industry sources informed the media that shipments had resumed, 
unofficially ending the REE embargo the same way it began two months earlier.250  The 
next section describes asymmetric interdependence with Japan in the REE sector that 
                                                 
247 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 52–53. 
248 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign 
Crises.” 
249 Martin Fackler and Ian Johnson, “Arrest in Disputed Seas Riles China and Japan,” The New York 
Times, Sept 19, 2010 (Page A1); Keith Bradsher, The New York Times, Sept 23, 2010; Ian Johnson, “China 
Arrests Four Japanese Amid Tensions,” The New York Times, September 24, 2010, A12; Martin Fackler 
and Ian Johnson, “Japan Retreats With Release of Chinese Boat Captain,” The New York Times, Sept 24, 
2010, A1; Edward Wong and Keith Bradsher, “Chinese Leader Denies Using Mineral Exports for Political 
Ends,” The New York Times, October 9, 2010. 
250 Keith Bradsher, “China Restarts Rare Earth Shipments to Japan,” The New York Times, November 
20, 2010, B5. 
 78
provided Beijing with the REE lever.  As discussed in chapter III, it is unclear when 
precisely Beijing recognized the coercive value of this lever.  It is clear, however, this 
asymmetry developed as a consequence of accelerated businesses migration to China in 
the wake of its 2001 WTO accession. 
2. Asymmetric Interdependence Adds Injury to GDP Insult 
The 2010 Senkakus crisis played out in the context of China’s much anticipated 
achievement as the second largest global economy.  Here, China displaced Japan from a 
level of economic status it held since 1968, when Japan overtook West Germany.251  
Though technically a larger aggregate economy than Japan, measured in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) by exchange rate (e.g., 2011 GDP: China U.S. $6.989 trillion; Japan U.S. 
$5.855 trillion), the Chinese economy remains less developed relative to Japan.  Because 
the renminbi is not convertible on China’s capital account, GDP derived by the exchange 
rate is inaccurate.  By per capita GDP, Japan remains ahead: at U.S. $34,000, its 2011 per 
capita GDP was more than four-times China’s at U.S. $8,400.252  Though the degree to 
which this reversal in global economic status matters in economic terms is debatable, it 
did mark a shift in international prestige from Japan to China.  The key point for this 
study is that the two economies are near peer competitors; traditional Hirschmanesque 
logic does not apply since neither side depends exclusively on the other. 
Asymmetric interdependence in the REE sector created the structural conditions 
for China to develop a coercive lever.  Three additional points clarify why these 
conditions mattered more than aggregate economic size measured by GDP.   First, China-
Japan economic ties are extensive (e.g., “hot economics”) and date back to the 1970s.  
Second, while China is Japan’s primary trading partner, and a major destination for 
Japanese FDI, Sino-Japanese trade remains relatively balanced.  In fact before the 
exogenous shock of the March 2011 Tsunami, Japan ran a net surplus in exports with 
China.  Third, Japan maintains a robust domestic consumer market, insulating it from 
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total reliance on export-led growth.253  In sum, Japan does not depend on the Chinese 
economy to an extent that Hirschmanesque effects skew bilateral economic exchanges. 
Japan does rely on China for between 80–90% of its REE imports primarily for its 
automobile and electronics industries (e.g., ~25,000 tons annually).254  China is also a 
major destination for Japanese REE-derived exports.  For example, in 2010 China 
exported 48% of its REEs to Japan, and it imported 82% of REE-derived products from 
Japan.255 Given its dependence on China for both REE imports and exports, Japan cannot 
diversify because there are no other REE sources available globally in sufficient 
quantities.  While Japanese companies reportedly have unknown quantities of REE 
stockpiles, these supplies would probably not sustain long-term operations.256  
Meanwhile, China does not depend on Japan as a destination for REE exports: it exports 
REEs to South Korea, the United States and the EU among others; and domestic demand 
within China could overtake production.  In some respects, REE trade reflects a classic 
pattern of commodities for products in which China appears disadvantaged.  Yet due to 
asymmetric interdependence in the REE sector, Japan assumed the role of a smaller 
economy unable to diversify its imports beyond China. 
This asymmetric interdependence evolved with global industrial trends described 
in chapter III, notably the movement of REE mining industries to China in response to 
environmental concerns and global price reductions.  Pushed out of Japan by these same 
concerns, many Japanese REE companies moved to China in two waves during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  In the first wave, businesses relocated to China as joint ventures, lured by 
access to mineable REE reserves, lax environmental standards and cheap labor.  Japan 
opened facilities elsewhere with less success.  For example, work continues on 
Mitsubishi Chemical’s $100 million radioactive waste cleanup of its defunct REE 
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refinery site in Malaysia.  The site closed in 1992 after years of environmental protests by 
Malaysian citizens.257 
In the second wave, REE-based manufacturing companies joined the flood of high 
technology name brand firms that set up shop in China following its 2001 WTO 
accession -- Mitsui Chemical, Sumitomo, NEC, Matsushita Electronics, Toshiba, Sony, 
Honda, Isuzu and Mazda.258  This optimism began deteriorating within a few years.  As 
discussed in chapter III, China implemented several industrial policies in the later half of 
the past decade to roll back unregulated growth in the REE sector.  On the one hand, 
these policies led to price spikes that increased profits for REE exporters, including 
foreign firms.  On the other hand, the same policies (e.g. production and export quotas) 
threatened business confidence for REE miners and importers. 
Prior to the 2010 crisis, Japanese officials and businesses certainly understood the 
asymmetric effects of Chinese REE consolidation on Japan’s REE industry.  Due to 
declining Chinese export quotas from 2005 to 2009, Japanese FDI flowed to REE 
projects in Kazakhstan, India, Vietnam, Canada, the United States and Mongolia.  Less 
than one month before the 2010 Senkakus crisis, METI representatives met with 
MOFCOM officials to discuss the 40% drop between 2009 and 2010 export quotas and 
the resulting 30% price spike in Japanese imports.  When this level of engagement failed 
to increase exports, Foreign Minister Okada raised the issue with Premier Wen during the 
High-Level Economic Dialogue in Beijing August 28-29, who insisted the policies 
sought to reverse “overexploitation” and reassured Okada present export levels would 
continue.  On September 8, the same day of the Senkakus collision, Vice Premier Li 
Keqiang offered the same reassurances without making concessions to Chairman 
Yonekura Hiromasa, leader of the Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation).259 
Clearly by 2009, and arguably much earlier in the decade, Beijing recognized that 
asymmetric interdependence in the REE sector presented levers it could exercise in 
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economic statecraft.  Japanese business activities to diversify mining sources and 
government communication of Japanese concerns with export restrictions implied as 
much.  Though Beijing managed the REE export regime actively, it had not imposed an 
REE embargo before.  It is possible the 2010 export quota reflected a deliberate 
preliminary step toward the embargo (e.g. first shot across the bow).  There are two 
problems here.  First, Beijing reduced export quotas for the past five years.  Second, 
Beijing did not necessarily have a valid political objective precipitating coercive lever 
exercise against Japan. 
As discussed in chapter III, Beijing prefers inducements to coercion in its 
economic statecraft.  Though progressing, it lacks experience with some types of levers.  
Despite these conservative guidelines, coercive lever exercise can become a viable policy 
option in reactionary scenarios.  Trade wars are an obvious trigger of retaliatory sanctions 
(e.g., the garlic wars).  International crises offer another potential trigger.  If the crisis 
involves nationalist sentiments, it pressurizes Beijing’s crisis response apparatus.  Here, 
senior leadership must balance competing priorities among various stakeholders and issue 
areas to reach a consensus decision.  As the next section demonstrates, the 2010 
Senkakus crisis met these criteria. 
3. Japan says Senkaku, China says Diaoyu, Both say East China Sea 
Convergence of the 2010 Senkakus crisis with asymmetric interdependence in the 
REE sector provided Beijing with the opportunity to exercise the REE lever coercively.  
For several decades, China and Japan disputed both the territorial sovereignty of the 
Senkaku Islands and the maritime sovereignty of overlapping exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ) in the East China Sea (ECS).  For Sino-Japanese relations, these disputes 
underscored the contentious political rivalry between East Asia’s largest economic 
powers.  Like the ongoing disputes among multiple claimants in the South China Sea, the 
Senkakus and ECS disputes fell into the same category of high-stakes maritime 
flashpoints involving China and its neighbors.  This study argues that escalation of the 
2010 flare-up triggered Beijing’s decision to exercise the lever in the situational stage. 
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Informal engagement patterns governed Sino-Japanese responses to periodic 
flare-ups, often preventing escalation to crisis levels.  Typical of the pattern, Beijing 
issued protests and made marginal concessions without backing down from its original 
claims.260  Meanwhile, Japanese ships that found Chinese vessels in territorial waters, or 
in the Japanese EEZ, escorted these vessels outside the area without further incident.  The 
2010 flare-up began with a collision between a Chinese fishing vessel and a Japanese 
Coast Guard Vessel.  When both sides departed from typical patterns of behavior, the 
episode escalated quickly to an international crisis involving the highest levels of 
leadership on both sides.  Breaking with the past, Tokyo detained the Chinese captain and 
vowed prosecution in a Japanese court.  With few viable policy options at its disposal, 
Beijing’s departure featured explicit coercive lever exercise, a policy option it had not 
pursued before in a bilateral security crisis. 
The nature of the Sino-Japanese disputes in the Senkakus and ECS reflected 
distinct historical and legal interpretations of sovereignty dating back to the 1895 Sino-
Japanese War.  Japan claimed the Senkakus since it incorporated the three islands and 
five rocks in 1895, an area no larger than three square miles.261  It lost them to the U.S. 
in WWII until 1972, when Japan regained administrative control of the Senkakus with the 
return of Okinawa.  Japan has administered the islands since then.  China claimed the 
islands, which it called the Diaoyus, should have returned to China at the end of WWII.  
Following the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves under the seabed, both countries issued 
formal claims on the islands in 1970.  At the same time, both sides claimed overlapping 
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) per the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
over a large area in the East China Sea - 160,000 square miles of water.262  In addition to 
vast undersea hydrocarbon resources, the waters above supported massive fish stocks 
vital to fishery industries on both sides. 
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Competing interpretations of UNCLOS informed these disputes as well.  U.S. 
Naval War College professor Peter Dutton argued the Chinese position differed from 
Japan by treating EEZ claims in the East China Sea as Chinese territorial waters (e.g., 
“full sovereign rights and jurisdiction”), rather than as international waters open to 
commercial and military transit per UNCLOS.  According to this interpretation, 
commercial ships cannot transit through China’s claimed EEZ without permission, much 
less fish or drill for oil.  Likewise, warships could not conduct gunnery exercises or 
launch helicopters.  Chinese claims in the South China Sea reflected the same mix of 
historical and legal interpretation.  In contrast, Japan’s EEZ claim conformed to 
UNCLOS provisions based on continental shelf limits.  To resolve the dispute, Japan 
proposed the two sides agree on a median line equidistant from the baselines of China’s 
eastern coast and Japan’s Ryukyu Island Chain, which China subsequently rejected.263 
More frequent flare-ups in both disputed areas over the past decade coincided 
with increased resource competition.  Given mutual status as net energy importers, the 
economic stakes were high for both sides.  Located in the disputed EEZ area, China’s 
Chunxiao Natural Gas Development Project sits on top of an estimated 12.7 million tons 
of oil and 65.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas.264  There were two promising 
examples of cooperation.  First, Beijing and Tokyo implemented a 1997 fisheries treaty 
in 2000 that allowed 600 Chinese fishing vessels east of a zoning line each year.  Second, 
in 2008, both sides reached an agreement to pursue joint exploration of hydrocarbon 
resources in the ECS, the first agreement of its kind between China and another country 
with overlapping maritime claims.  Little progress occurred until negotiations began in 
late July 2010 to implement the agreement in Tokyo, less than two months before the 
2010 flare-up.  The crisis stalled further progress.  Citing Japan’s decision to detain 
Captain Zhan and his crew, Beijing postponed the next round of negotiations originally 
scheduled to commence later in September.265 
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Bilateral episodes near the islands provoked by non-state actors were a relatively 
new phenomenon.  Driven by resource nationalism, these incidents risked escalation to 
crisis levels if managed poorly by Beijing and Tokyo.266  In 1996, separate groups of 
businessmen from Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan stirred up international interest when 
they planted flags on the islands.  Chinese nationalists aboard civilian vessels drew 
attention with their first landing in 2004.  Then in 2008, China sent two maritime survey 
vessels to territorial waters around the Senkakus.  From then on, Japan increased 
maritime patrols with more capable coast guard vessels.  However, escort of Chinese 
vessels outside disputed areas remained Tokyo’s policy.  For its part, China repressed 
national media reporting on the Senkakus compared with other flashpoints like Taiwan, 
suggesting some reluctance in Beijing to channel nationalist sentiment to the Senkakus 
and ECS disputes.267  For the most part, following the 2004 and 2008 flare-ups both 
sides took measures to prevent nationalist protestors from visiting the islands regularly. 
In addition to these incidents, increased naval activity near the disputed areas 
heightened security tensions on both sides.  In contrast with past episodes initiated by 
commercial actors, potential conflict between military actors posed a much greater risk.  
On the Chinese side, PLAN patrols in the East China Sea expanded steadily since 2004, 
including incursions into territorial waters around the Senkakus and Japan’s claimed 
EEZ.  Though protested consistently by Japan, and defended consistently by China, 
increased PLAN activity did not spiral into armed conflict.  Japan monitored these events 
closely and shifted defense priorities to the Senkakus and ECS areas.  Released a year 
after the 2010 Senkakus crisis, Japan’s 2011 Defense White Paper noted concern with 
China’s increased naval activity in the “waters surrounding Japan,” including a recent 
transit by an 11-ship flotilla.268  Though deliberate conflict appeared unlikely, analysts 
warned the frequency of both navies in the disputed areas increased the likelihood of an 
unintended military crisis in the long term.269 
                                                 
266 Dutton, 65; Swaine and Fravel, 9; Shirk, 62–64. 
267 Fravel, "Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute," 153. 
268 Japan Ministry of Defense, “Defense of Japan 2011 White Paper.”  Accessed at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html 
269 Swaine and Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Two The Maritime Periphery,” 9. 
 85
At least two security factors prevented China from pressing its claims with 
military force in past flare-ups and in the 2010 Senkakus case.270  First, the Japan 
Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) remained a formidable navy, though the maritime 
balance continued to shift toward the PLAN.  Second, the U.S.-Japan Alliance deterred 
China from escalating periodic bilateral crises and risking armed conflict with the United 
States.  In fact, this factor may explain Japanese assertiveness.  For example, in each of 
the previous Senkakus crises – 1972, 1996, 2004, 2008 and 2010 – Japan pressed the 
United States to state publicly that U.S.-Japan security treaty obligations covered the 
Senkakus.271  On September 23, senior U.S. officials made this affirmation.272  A month 
later, during a press conference with Foreign Minister Maehara, Secretary Clinton 
responded to a Japanese reporter, “let me say clearly again the Senkakus fall within the 
scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security.”273  These reassurances contributed to Tokyo’s decision to expedite resolution 
of the crisis on September 24, a day after indications of the REE embargo made 
international headlines.  If this development followed the pattern since 1972, then 
Tokyo’s earlier decision to detain Captain Zhan marked a clear departure. 
When the 2010 crisis escalated, Beijing pursued a range of coercive policy 
options besides military force to signal protest and resolve.  From Beijing’s perspective, 
Tokyo’s unprecedented detention of Captain Zhan exacerbated nationalist sentiments 
avoided in the past by adherence to ground rules and careful diplomatic management.  
Beijing did not order the Chinese fishing vessel to ram Japanese Coast Guard ships, but 
Tokyo did allow the Ishigaki court on Okinawa to detain Captain Zhan.  Following this 
escalation, the domestic political value of standing up to Japan outweighed immediate 
concern for the broader Sino-Japanese relationship. 
Given the expectation of future conflict with Tokyo over the Senkakus and ECS 
disputes, coercion became a viable policy option.  However, Beijing could not risk 
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inadvertent military conflict with Japan or the United States by deploying warships.  
Instead, aggressive diplomatic and propaganda campaigns featured repeated demarches 
of the Japanese ambassador and public condemnations of Tokyo.  Anti-Japanese protests 
occurred over several days in October, demonstrated Beijing’s renewed willingness to 
allow public intervention in select foreign policy disputes for domestic political gain.  In 
weighing additional options for escalation against Tokyo, Beijing probably calculated it 
could assume the risks of coercion in economic statecraft.  Asymmetric interdependence 
with Japan in the REE sector provided the lever.  In the 2010 Senkakus crisis the 
requisite situational elements existed for Beijing to depart from inducement preferences 
and exercise the lever coercively.  The next section on the application stage describes 
how Beijing actually exercised the lever and offers a more detailed explanation for why. 
4. Rare Earths: An Implicitly Explicit Coercive Lever  
Short of an official document or statement linking the REE suspension with 
orders from Beijing, this study cannot establish empirical proof of an official embargo.  
There was no press conference announcing suspension; information trickled into the 
international media through Japanese industry sources.  In response to these reports and 
appeals by Japanese officials to resume REE shipments throughout the two-month period, 
Chinese leadership repeatedly denied ordering the suspension, including Foreign Minister 
Yiang Jiechi, MOFCOM Minister Chen Deming and Premier Wen.  During a speech at 
the Sixth China-EU Business Summit in October, Wen did not mince his words, “we 
haven't imposed, and will not impose, an embargo on the industry.”274  Ironically, 
Premier Wen is a trained geologist who presumably studied REEs at Beijing Institute of 
Geology in the 1960s and certainly grasped China’s domestic REE industry as a Vice 
Minister of Geology and Mineral Resources in the 1980s.275  Here, implausible 
deniability allowed Chinese leadership to avoid public comments that might conflict with 
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China’s WTO obligations.  Promotion of Beijing’s international reputation as a 
responsible major power remained a clear strategic priority. 
Trade data tell a different story.  Based on trade statistics analyzed by the 
Congressional Research Service, Chinese REE exports to Japan dropped precipitously 
from several thousand tons to several hundred tons during the two-month embargo.276   
This trend reversed course after the embargo ended.  Reuters reported REE imports from 
China climbed from 634 tons in November to 4,080 tons in December based on Japanese 
Ministry of Finance data.  Similar to the garlic wars, this spike in volume also suggests 
Beijing released large quantities of REEs impounded by customs during the two-month 
embargo.  Total REE imports to Japan in 2010 were 28,564 tons, of which Chinese REE 
imports accounted for 82% at 23,310 tons.277  Given these official discrepancies, 
unofficial embargo is a more precise characterization of what happened.  This result begs 
two questions, was the REE suspension an example of an explicit coercive lever and why 
did Beijing adopt this approach? 
Addressing the first question, this study argues the REE embargo probably began 
as an implicit coercive lever conveyed through diplomatic and industry channels in 
closed-door settings.  Beijing warned Seoul in advance it would impose a retaliatory ban 
during the 2000 garlic war with South Korea.278  Since Beijing denied imposing the REE 
embargo in any form, this study speculates that when the threat of REE suspension failed 
to persuade Tokyo to release Captain Zhan, between September 14–23, Beijing took 
further action.  It follows that once the implicit threat of REE suspension materialized as 
an observable foreign policy outcome, coercive lever exercise became explicit.  If the 
implicit threat were successful, then Tokyo would have released Captain Zhan before 
reports of the REE suspension.  It is possible Beijing planned to exercise the lever 
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regardless of Tokyo’s subsequent behavior once the flare-up escalated to crisis levels.  
However, this study argues an implicit period preceded the shift to explicit exercise due 
to Beijing’s general reluctance to exercise coercive levers in economic statecraft. 
To answer why Beijing adopted this unofficial approach, it is necessary to clarify 
how coercive lever exercise supported desired policy objectives in the context of 
economic statecraft.  Like Baldwin, this study assumes economic statecraft reflects 
embedded decision-making processes in which policy options are matched to desired 
objectives.  Beijing does not select among levers because China is a revisionist or status 
quo power, Chinese leaders make consensus-driven decisions based on domestic and 
international constraints.  Given the constraints derived from Chinese grand strategy, 
foreign policy making and political economy trends described in chapter III, Beijing’s 
political objectives were short-term out of necessity.  Coercion conflicted with the 
strategic concepts of “economic diplomacy” and “peaceful development.”  It was 
antithetical to inducement preferences.  Though not a lost cause, managing the China 
threat in Japan placed Beijing at cross-purposes with the domestic political value of anti-
Japanese nationalism.  Yet the escalatory nature of the 2010 Senkakus crisis pressurized 
Beijing’s foreign policy apparatus and altered the transaction costs of various coercive 
policy options.  
Though willing to assume additional risk in Sino-Japanese relations, Beijing 
could not afford prolonged risk to its international reputation as a responsible major 
power.  Here, unofficial coercive exercise presumably allowed Chinese leadership to 
avoid making public comments that would run afoul of China’s WTO accession protocol.  
This point explains the Chinese leadership’s consistent denial of the embargo and 
simultaneous defense of industrial policies in the Chinese REE sector (e.g., export 
quotas) as supporting “sustainable development.”279  Meanwhile, from a political 
economy perspective, prolonged exercise of the REE lever could quickly become 
counterproductive, threatening economic development priorities by disrupting supply 
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chains and raising concerns among other foreign MNCs based in China.  Adding to 
uncertainty, Beijing had not exercised the REE lever before; it was an untested capability. 
It follows that Beijing exercised the REE lever coercively to achieve three short-
term political objectives against two targets.  The primary target was the Japanese 
government and the secondary target was the Japanese REE industry, consisting of 
roughly 30 companies based in Japan.  Based primarily on inductive logic, this study 
asserts the REE embargo advanced three short-term objectives: 1) signaling resolve by 
amplifying official protest against Japan without provoking the U.S.-Japan Alliance; 2) 
lobbying Tokyo to release Captain Zhan, ending the crisis; 3) hastening a third wave of 
Japanese REE business relocation to China in support of REE sector reforms.   
Evidence draws from several observable outcomes.  Beijing exercised the lever in 
ways that isolated Japan from other REE importers.  The embargo only applied to 
concentrated REE exports consumed primarily by downstream manufacturers in Japan.  
As The New York Times Hong Kong bureau chief Keith Bradsher, who covered the crisis 
extensively noted, “China’s quotas and the shipping embargo have involved only 
shipments in which the material has a rare earth content of about 50% or more.”280  Even 
after the embargo, Japan remained China’s primary customer for this REE type.  Exports 
of REE-derived products (e.g., SmCo magnets) continued without incident.  In fact, these 
products were not subject to export quotas before the REE embargo, indicating a dual 
incentive to promote domestic movement up the value-added supply chain and lure 
foreign businesses to China.  In October, unconfirmed industry reports suggested that 
Beijing extended the embargo to the United States and Europe.281  If anything, 
perceptions of an expanded REE embargo validated Beijing’s conservative approach to 
short-term exercise. 
Some Chinese officials argued the suspension happened spontaneously due to 
widespread nationalist sentiments that manifested at the local level.  MOFCOM Minister 
                                                 
280 Keith Bradsher, “China Is Said to Resume Shipping Rare Earth Minerals,” The New York Times, 
Oct 29, 2010, B1. 
281 Keith Bradsher, “China Said to Widen Its Embargo of Minerals,” The New York Times, October 
20, 2010, B1. 
 90
Chen Deming implied as much when he said, “I believe entrepreneurs, they will have 
their own feelings, and will do their own thing.”282  Other than as an explanation for 
smuggling during the embargo, this defense is problematic for several reasons.  First, the 
REE suspension required national coordination among at least four central bureaucracies 
(e.g., MEP, MLR, MOFCOM, MIIT), provincial and local governments, Chinese SOEs 
in the REE sector, and 31 authorized REE exporters, of which nine were foreign MNCs.  
This level of coordination could not happen by itself.  Though unsubstantiated, Bradsher 
references “a secret meeting in Beijing” in September 2010, in which officials notified 
the presidents of Chinese REE companies the embargo would occur and advised 
noncompliance would cost their REE production licenses.283 
Second, implementation of the REE embargo occurred at the local level in a 
uniform way across provinces.  Customs officials stalled administrative procedures, 
including "export license applications, customs clearance, and shipment processing.”284 
Reports in early September initially trickled in from Shanghai, but soon expanded to 
multiple provinces.  Small quantities of REE exports did get through added to the 
confusion among Japanese industry and government officials.  In late September, Japan’s 
METI settled the matter by surveying all 30 Japanese REE companies.  The survey 
results indicated widespread increases in Chinese REE customs inspections.  Seaborne 
inspection rates increased 20-30%, while air cargo rates increased 50%.285  If this were 
not an embargo, it represented government failure across the Chinese customs apparatus. 
As this study argued in Chapter III, central-local interests do not align perfectly in 
the Chinese REE sector.  Policies attenuate from Beijing bureaucracies to local officials 
concerned with promoting growth and repressing social unrest.  Not all Chinese REE 
companies benefit from REE industrial policies and tensions exist between local 
governments and enterprises.  Prior to the embargo, rising prices favored exporters over 
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producers, who bore the regulatory costs of mining, separating and refining REEs.  
Caijing recently quoted a Chinese REE industry source in Jiangxi province frustrated 
with local licensing, production quotas and bureaucratic gridlock.  "Even if we were 
granted a production quota of 600 tons of rare earths,” the source noted, “where should I 
mine the 600 tons of rare earths (if not allowed to buy mines freely)?"286 
Despite the implementation challenges of REE sector reforms, it is implausible 
Beijing could not execute the REE embargo given its control over the 31 licensed 
exporters.  Equally dubious is the notion it would take two months to stop the embargo 
upon confirmation of suspended exports from Japan.  Like the strategic and reputation 
management considerations, these sectorial trends constrained exercise of the REE lever 
by limiting duration.  Prolonged suspension could disrupt domestic supply chains 
undermining vertical integration.  Of greater potential concern to Beijing was the risk of 
expanded black market operations in the southern provinces, in which the vast majority 
of China’s highly valuable heavy REE reserves were located. 
Finally, in the months following the 2010 Senkakus crisis, REE shipments 
resumed in conjunction with thawing diplomatic relations.  High-level leadership 
meetings on the margins of the October EAS and November APEC summits marked a 
downshift from coercive politics to diplomatic management.  Initiated by the Japanese 
side, these developments reinforced Beijing’s primary objective: signaling resolve and 
official protest.  When shipments resumed in late November, there was no official 
announcement.  The process simply reversed: customs officials reduced inspections and 
approved paper work; dockworkers loaded REE containers onto ships that got underway 
for Japan.  Instead of a Chinese official, METI’s Akihiro Ohata, confirmed on November 
24 that Chinese REE exports had resumed to Japan.287  The next section considers the 
effects stage of coercive lever exercise.  It covers the extent Beijing achieved desired 
objectives, along with state and commercial responses to the REE embargo. 
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5. Do Coercive Lever Effects and Territorial Disputes Mix?  
Beijing exercised the REE lever in the security context of the Senkakus and ECS 
disputes.  As with past episodes, the 2010 flare-up represented an intense political 
conflict that risked military escalation.  Ruling out a military response, Beijing sought 
policy alternatives, including the REE embargo to achieve objectives.  Compared with 
coercive lever examples over the past decade, this case involved both economic and 
security objectives.  Again the three short-term objectives were: 1) signaling resolve by 
amplifying official protest without provoking the U.S.-Japan Alliance, 2) lobbying Tokyo 
to release Captain Zhan, 3) hastening a third wave of Japanese REE business relocation 
to China.  Coercive lever exercise clearly contributed to the first objective, and arguably 
contributed to the second objective.  Since the embargo was part of a comprehensive 
response, “contribute” is an accurate measure.  Like Baldwin, this study argues economic 
statecraft does not need to account for 100% of an outcome to have a meaningful effect. 
In the long term, coercive lever exercise did not advance resolution of the 
Senkakus or ECS disputes, nor did Tokyo move any closer to Beijing politically.  In fact, 
it moved closer to the U.S.-Japan alliance.  Undoubtedly, the episode raised Japanese 
perceptions of the China threat.  The Japanese press criticized Beijing’s behavior during 
the crisis and Japan’s 2011 Defense White Paper pointed to the ECS as an elevated area 
of concern.  Whether Beijing advanced these security issues matters less than the fact that 
it wielded economic statecraft during a security crisis, breaking with past examples like 
the garlic wars and tatami mat wars in which import bans were reciprocal responses to 
economic disputes.  The next chapter develops this point further. 
It is possible Beijing overreached in pursuit of the third objective to hasten a third 
wave of REE business relocation to Japan.  In the short term, Japanese commercial and 
government responses to the REE embargo were mixed. During the two-month 
suspension, Japanese companies survived by accessing REE stockpiles and purchasing 
REEs from Vietnamese traders, allegedly sourced by smugglers in Southern China.288  
Japanese companies already had a presence in Vietnam.  For example, Showa Denko 
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opened an REE alloy facility in Ha Nam province near Hanoi in 2008.  Tokyo funded a 
2009 REE mine development project in Vietnam that built “roads, bridges, electricity, 
water supply, schools, and hospitals.”289  Japan’s oldest REE firm, Dowa Holdings, 
experimented with recycling REEs from electronics, though this effort proved analogous 
to turning lead into gold.   
Nearly a year passed before limited indicators emerged of a third wave of REE 
migration to China.  In August 2011, two Japanese companies, Showa Denko and 
Santoku of Japan, added facilities in China to guarantee access to REEs.290  In response 
to these movements, The Daily Yomiuri and the Nikkei Weekly released editorials critical 
of the moves, and urged the government to intervene before additional manufacturing 
firms moved to China.  In fact, METI announced several industrial policies in 2011, 
including a U.S. $370 million subsidy for companies to research and develop REE-free 
technologies.291 
Meanwhile, long-term changes began in the global REE industry, including 
supply chain diversification and the potential discovery of new maritime reserves, 
reversing the trend of the past 25 years.  Japan’s top REE trading company, Sojitz, made 
a 250 million deal with the Australian firm Lynas to purchase 3,000 tons initially and up 
to 9,000 tons a year starting in 2013 from a new Mount Weld mine in Australia.  Lynas 
also recently received permission from Malaysian authorities to open a facility in 
Kuantan that refines REEs mined from Mount Weld.  Progress depends on Lynas’ 
compliance with environmental regulations in response to ongoing public concern with 
radiation hazards.292  In the summer of 2011, a Japanese research team claimed 
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discovery of more than 1,000 times the proven land-based REE reserves in a massive 
area in the Pacific Ocean spanning from Hawaii to Tahiti.293 
Companies based in the United States, Canada and Germany also initiated 
projects to open mines outside of China.  U.S. firm Molycorp reopened the California 
Mountain Pass mine early in 2012.294  The company also announced plans to acquire one 
of two global REE chemical producers, Canadian firm Neo Material, a controversial 
development because Neo Material owns facilities in China. 295  Another Canadian firm, 
Great Western Minerals Group, launched the Steenkampskraal mine refurbishment 
project in South Africa to extract heavy REEs.296  Representing EU interests, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel personally negotiated a deal with her counterpart in 
Kazakhstan to allow German companies to survey and mine REEs there.297   
Whether these developments become profitable depends on how quickly 
companies advance along the average ten-year timeline from discovery to mining 
operations.  It took China 60 years to dominate the REE industry and it will likely remain 
a key supplier for several years.  Similar to China’s effect on energy markets, 
diversification of the global REE industry seems to be a long-term effect of Chinese 
policies on global prices and supplies, not least of all, the two-month REE embargo.  It is 
unclear whether Beijing anticipated this shift, but given rising REE demand in China it 
may prove a win-win outcome. 
6. Dilemmas Of World Trade Accession For Coercive Leverage 
This section summarizes two WTO actions associated with this case study that are 
potentially important in the broader context of Chinese economic statecraft.  Many of the 
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conditions of asymmetric interdependence described in this study developed since 
China’s WTO accession in 2001 in which China deepened integration with the global 
economy.  Accession took China nearly 15 years to achieve.  It represents the 
culmination of Chinese commitment to market-oriented reforms and is by no means a 
trivial matter in Chinese political economy.  However, the essence of statecraft involves 
weighing various policy options and matching capabilities to achievable objectives under 
domestic and international constraints.  As this case demonstrates, this process can result 
in selection of policy options (e.g., coercive lever exercise) that are at cross-purposes 
with broader priorities (e.g., reputation management).  Clearly, WTO obligations shaped 
Beijing’s decision to exercise the lever unofficially.  The relevant question is whether 
these shifts have a lasting effect on Chinese economic statecraft preferences.  Though 
beyond the scope of this study, a potential area for future research relates to how ongoing 
adaptation to WTO rules and norms shapes Chinese economic statecraft. 
The WTO dealt an indirect blow to the Chinese REE industry in July 2011, in 
which its dispute settlement panel issued a long-awaited ruling from a 2009 case filed by 
the United States, EU and Mexico.  It found Chinese export restrictions on nine raw 
materials essential to high technology manufacturing in violation of WTO rules.  Though 
REEs were not part of this case, the violations mirrored Chinese export restrictions in the 
REE industry.  U.S. Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, and the EU Trade Representative, 
Karel De Gucht, linked the ruling to China’s REE industry and called on China to change 
its behavior.  Gucht noted, “China should ensure free and fair access to rare earth 
supplies.”298  In response to China’s appeal six months later, the WTO’s highest tribunal, 
the Appellate Body, ruled that while the settlement panel overreached in its definition of 
free trade violations, Chinese export policies were not temporarily applied, and therefore, 
were “inconsistent with China's Accession Protocol and the GATT 1994.”299 
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More than 18 months after the 2010 Senkakus crisis began, the United States, 
Japan and the European Union filed a WTO complaint against Chinese REE export 
restrictions on March 13, 2012.  In his remarks, President Barack Obama stated American 
manufacturers could not access Chinese REEs due to Beijing’s policies, which “go 
against the very rules that China agreed to follow.”300  The United States played a key 
security role in the 2010 Senkakus crisis and U.S. companies participated in subsequent 
REE diversification efforts.  Here, the U.S. government officially joined multinational 
responses to the Chinese REE industry.  Beijing’s response did not depart from past REE 
sector talking points.  MIIT Minister Miao Wei acknowledged the case and noted China 
would defend itself.301  MOFCOM issued a statement subsequently reiterated by Chinese 
leadership: “China’s policy objective is to protect resources and environment in order to 
achieve sustainable development, and it has no intention of protecting domestic industries 
through trade-distorting measures.”302  Though it will take several months, if not years, 
before WTO adjudicates this case, it offers a key source of data for analysts interested in 
the effects of coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In the 2010 Senkakus dispute, Beijing exercised the REE lever coercively against 
Japan to achieve three short-term objectives: 1) signaling resolve by amplifying official 
protest against Japan without provoking the U.S.-Japan Alliance; 2) lobbying Tokyo to 
release Captain Zhan, ending the crisis; 3) hastening a third wave of Japanese REE 
business relocation to China in support of REE sector reforms.  Objective selection 
largely confirmed H2.   
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Asymmetric interdependence with Japan in the REE sector provided Beijing with 
the lever.  Its creation in the asymmetric stage was not a deliberate strategic outcome 
dating back to 1949 when the REE industry became intertwined with China’s political 
economy.  Instead, the lever developed gradually as a consequence of reform era 
economic policies that promoted China’s domestic REE sector along with other 
economic development priorities.  Beijing recognized the lever’s coercive potential over 
the past decade, as Japanese dependency on Chinese REE imports deepened with the 
accelerated movement of Japanese businesses to China.  Given Beijing’s preference for 
inducements in economic statecraft, these conditions were insufficient to support 
coercive lever exercise. 
A combination of situational factors triggered explicit coercive exercise of the 
REE lever during the 2010 Senkakus crisis, including strained Sino-Japanese relations, 
the escalatory nature of the crisis and reactionary nationalism on both sides.  In 
combination, these factors pressurized Beijing’s foreign policy apparatus in the 
situational stage and its three-pronged response to Tokyo was coercive across the board.  
If Beijing had not met these criteria, it could not justify the costs of coercive options.  
Conscious of its WTO obligations, Beijing exercised the lever unofficially, but in 
an observably explicit way in the application stage.  Tactics targeted China’s 31 
authorized REE exporters and employed local customs officials to suspend REE 
shipments destined for Japan.  Confirming H1, Beijing could not maintain the embargo 
indefinitely without damaging China’s commercial reputation and domestic development 
priorities.  Relations with the target state still mattered.  Japan remained a major 
economic partner and once Tokyo initiated a diplomatic thaw, Beijing followed suit.  The 
embargo ended quietly though it amplified international efforts to diversify REE supplies 
that continue to unfold in the effects stage. 
  Three factors made this case remarkable.  First, Beijing exercised the lever 
coercively in ways that maximized existing conditions of asymmetric interdependence in 
the REE sector.  Second, the lever matched the desired political objectives in terms of 
scope, duration and achievability.  Third, Beijing exercised an economic lever in 
response to a security dispute against a near peer competitor that was also a formidable 
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economic and military power.  In contrast with the Sino-American mini-case, described 
in the next chapter, Beijing successfully transitioned, or possibly skipped, the shift from 
implicit to explicit coercive lever exercise.  Taken together, these outcomes suggest the 
role of coercive levers in Chinese economic statecraft will continue to evolve in 
unanticipated ways as China’s economic integration with the global economy deepens.  
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V. COERCIVE LEVER APPLICATION MINICASES  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter analyzes three mini-cases in which Beijing exercised coercive levers 
against South Korea (1999–2000), Japan (2001) and the United States (2010).  In the 
Sino-Korean garlic wars, Beijing wagered the relatively higher value of Korean industrial 
products against its agricultural products during a trade war on the eve of WTO 
accession.  In the Sino-Japanese garlic war, Beijing’s measured approach to explicit 
coercive lever exercise allowed both sides to save face and pursue the China dream.  A 
decade later, Tokyo’s ambivalence and Beijing’s defiance produced strikingly different 
outcomes.  Implicit coercive lever exercise backfired during the Sino-American Taiwan 
arms sale dispute.  In fact, this last case presents obvious contrasts with the Senkakus 
crisis nine months later.  Following the three mini-cases, this chapter offers conclusions 
and implications for further research, ending the study. 
B. GARLIC, TATAMI MATS, AND ARMS: IS THIS EVOLUTION? 
1. Sino-Korean Garlic Wars (Implicit and Explicit Coercive Levers) 
Asymmetric interdependence worked in interesting ways on the eve of China’s 
WTO accession with the first “full-scale public trade war” in Sino-Korean relations.303 
During the garlic wars in 2000, Beijing imposed import bans on two South Korean 
products, mobile handsets and polyethylene, in retaliation for South Korean tariffs on two 
varieties of Chinese garlic, a 315% tariff on frozen garlic and a 436% tariff on pickled 
garlic.304  This textbook trade war marked a temporary setback in otherwise warm Sino-
Korean relations.  Bilateral economic exchanges reflected deepening regional integration 
during the reform era in which East Asian countries expanded access to the China 
market.  Bilateral trade increased from $19 million in 1979 to $41.2 billion in 2003.  
China became South Korea’s second largest export market (~13% total) and its primary 
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destination for FDI.  In fact, South Korea reversed the course of trade deficits and 
maintained an annual trade surplus with China following normalization in 1992.   
Beijing exploited two forms of asymmetric interdependence.  First, Beijing 
selected coercive levers based on the relative price differential between industrial goods 
and agricultural goods.  Second, Beijing relied on South Korea’s desire for continued 
access to the Chinese market for its industrial exports as a source of coercion (e.g., 
Studwell’s “China dream”).  The South Korean industrial goods represented 1.6% of the 
total trade volume with China and were 57 times the value of Chinese garlic imports.  
Asymmetric interdependence was strongest in the polyethylene sector, in which China 
accounted for 47% of all South Korean polyethylene exports.305  
South Korean actions combined with a series of suicides related to the tariffs in 
China triggered coercive lever exercise in the situational stage.  In contrast with Japan, 
Sino-Korean politics were warm and security cooperation was considerable.  Beijing was 
an early admirer of the South Korean economy, as one of East Asia’s four tigers,306 and 
lauded its quick recovery from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Yet rising Sino-Korean 
interdependence did not eliminate protectionism in South Korean domestic politics.  Due 
to a combination of increased competition with Chinese garlic imports and rising 
domestic productivity, earnings dropped in the South Korean garlic sector over 1998–
1999.  Farmers were an important constituency in South Korean politics, and represented 
by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), pointed to China as the 
primary cause for falling prices.  In fact, domestic production increased 22.8% while 
Chinese imports increased only 3.5%. 
Given the prospect of an upcoming election, South Korea’s Ministry of Finance 
and Economy (MOFE) imposed a provisional safeguard (e.g., temporary tariff) on 
Chinese garlic imports for 200 days in November 1999.307  As South Korean garlic 
importers cancelled contracts, garlic producers in China’s Shandong province, the source 
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for 80% of garlic exports, incurred huge losses.  When six garlic farmers from Changshan 
County committed suicide, it made national headlines.  This publicity added a sense of 
urgency to Beijing’s response.  Meanwhile, Seoul miscalculated Beijing’s knowledge of 
WTO rules and its willingness to retaliate.308  Revocation of the safeguards was 
Beijing’s immediate policy objective.  Though in the midst of final WTO negotiations, 
Beijing became determined to send a clear signal to Seoul and the international 
community it would not allow a state with a more developed market economy to trample 
on Chinese exports based on otherwise preferential relations.309 
Initially implicit, coercive lever exercise became explicit in the application stage.  
Twice in March 2000, Beijing warned it would retaliate with an import ban on industrial 
products if Seoul did not remove the provisional safeguards on its agricultural products.  
Beijing argued that Seoul overreached by imposing unilateral safeguards when it ran 
huge trade surpluses with China, and questioned Seoul’s compliance with WTO rules.  
According to GATT Article 2, provisional safeguards are not authorized unless the 
sending state can prove that increased imports harmed a domestic industry.310  When the 
threat of implicit coercion failed to prevent Seoul’s imposition of a full-fledged 
safeguard, Beijing skipped the preliminary step of tariffs and imposed an import ban on 
South Korean industrial products in June 2000.  While the retaliatory ban also violated 
WTO rules, China was not yet a member.  Implementation was uncomplicated: Beijing’s 
customs apparatus enforced the ban.  Over the next month, Chinese customs officials 
detained 27,200 tons of polyethylene and 20,000 tons of mobile handsets.311 
In the effects stage, Seoul’s response to the import ban reflected a shift in the 
domestic balance of influence from the agricultural lobby to the industrial lobby, 
underscoring the importance of domestic politics in the target state.  Faced with $100 
million in losses, the Korean Chamber of Commerce, Korean Association for 
Petrochemical Industries, and the Korean Association for the Promotion of Electronics 
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Industry all lobbied Seoul to drop the tariff, forcing the South Korean garlic industry to 
give up market share to China.312  The episode ended when Seoul expanded low-tariff 
quotas on Chinese garlic, nulling the effect of its full-fledged safeguards over the next 
three years, and Beijing released the impounded products.  In sum, Seoul was unprepared 
for a trade dispute with Beijing.  The garlic wars demonstrated Beijing’s willingness to 
“implement punitive actions” in response to increased protectionism in the target state 
and domestic social unrest that threatened China’s economic development priorities.313  
Consistent with H1 and H2, Beijing did not initiate coercive lever exercise; it was a 
retaliatory measure designed to end the dispute quickly and signal resolve. 
2. Sino-Japanese Tatami Mat Wars (Explicit Coercive Lever) 
The asymmetric stage of the tatami mat wars featured interesting contrasts with 
the garlic wars.  Due to a spike in Chinese agricultural imports that lowered domestic 
profits, Tokyo imposed provisional safeguards in April 2001, including a 256% tariff on 
leeks, a 260% tariff on shiitake mushrooms and a 100% tariff on straw rushes imported 
from China.314  Like Seoul the previous year, Tokyo faced an upcoming election and 
farmers were an important political constituency.  In June, Beijing retaliated with 100% 
tariffs on Japanese automobiles, cell phones and air conditioners to persuade Tokyo to 
allow the preliminary tariffs to expire.315  Broad bilateral economic patterns were similar 
to the Sino-Korean mini-case.  Following normalization in 1972, Sino-Japanese 
economic exchanges deepened: China became Japan’s primary trading partner and a 
major destination for Japanese businesses eager to access the China market.  Occurring a 
decade before the 2010 Senkakus crisis, in this case Japan remained the economic center 
of gravity in East Asia and Tokyo projected considerable influence through its vast 
economic statecraft resources.  For the past 20 years, China was the primary target of 
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Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and more than half Japan’s annual 
ODA went there in 2000 (~$10–15 million).316   
Heading into the tatami mat wars, Japan had more aggregate economic power and 
asymmetric leverage than China.  In 2001, Hirschmanescue logic favored Japan.  In 
contrast, a sliver of asymmetric interdependence helped the Chinese side.  Again the 
value of Japanese industrial products vastly exceeded the value of Chinese agricultural 
products.  However, the Chinese share of all three industrial products in total Japanese 
trade was only 0.2% and the Chinese share of Japanese automobile exports was only one 
percent in 2000.317  In sum, Japanese trade in these goods was considerably diversified 
beyond China; Hirschmanesque logic did not apply.  Similar to the South Korean case, 
Beijing relied on the lure of the Chinese market as its primary defense.  It turns out, 
Tokyo’s actions in the situational stage proved more significant than Beijing’s 
asymmetric interdependence in the relative trade value between agricultural and 
industrial goods. 
The relative value of Sino-Japanese relations on both sides was the key variable 
differentiating the garlic wars from the tatami mat wars in the situational stage.  Unlike 
Sino-Korean relations, Sino-Japanese relations featured the previously noted “cold 
politics, hot economics.”318  Periodic flare-ups across historical and security issues 
plagued relations.319  The most recent strain stemmed from Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichiro’s August 2000 visit to the Yasukuni Shine, a memorial to Japan’s war dead 
including 14 Class-A criminals from WWII.  However, at this point in the relationship, 
deepening economic exchanges was an urgent priority on both sides.  Beijing raced 
proudly toward WTO accession as Japanese companies raced confidently toward the 
Chinese mainland.  Determined to repair relations at the October APEC summit in 
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Shanghai, Koizumi visited the anti-Japanese War Memorial and issued his first verbal 
apology to President Jiang for Japanese victims of WWII.320  This overture improved the 
broader climate before leading into the trade dispute, and unlike the other cases, had a 
calming effect on Beijing’s foreign policy-making apparatus. 
Both sides exercised restraint during the application stage.  Compared with Seoul, 
Tokyo did not implement full-fledged safeguards and prolonged negotiations past the 
deadline to December 21.  At the APEC summit in Shanghai, METI’s Hiranuma Takeo 
consulted with MOFCOM’s Shi Guangsheng but failed to resolve the dispute.321  Tokyo 
also worried about provoking international perceptions of Japanese protectionism in the 
trade dispute (e.g., Japan bashing).322  Certainly, these considerations paralleled 
Beijing’s concerns with international reputation management.  
For its part, Beijing’s retaliation was measured compared with the garlic wars.  
Having just achieved accession in November, Beijing’s WTO obligations weighed 
heavily in its approach to Tokyo.  Beijing waited two months before matching tactics 
with Tokyo with the imposition of high tariffs.  Though Beijing skipped this preliminary 
step with Seoul, an implicit warning occurred six days before the explicit shift to an 
import ban.323  It is also possible Beijing warned Tokyo in advance of the tariffs.  By 
pitting Japanese industrial products against Chinese agricultural products, Beijing again 
overmatched coercive levers to signal resolve and influence domestic politics in the target 
state.  It would not remove the tariffs before Tokyo ruled out permanent safeguards.  
Once again, Beijing sought achievable short-term political objectives, confirming H2. 
Outcomes converged during the effects stage in both the garlic wars and tatami 
mat wars.  Like Seoul, Tokyo originally imposed the preliminary tariffs due to falling 
prices in its agricultural sector and due to the role of farmers as a key political 
constituency.  Yet deleterious effects occurred in both sectors.  Through October, prices 
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continued to fall among all three agricultural products, while Japanese automobile 
companies reported expected losses of 420 billion yen (~$40–50 million) if the import 
ban continued. 
As the trade dispute continued, Japanese business migration accelerated to China 
in anticipation of WTO accession.  Isuzu announced it would move sport utility vehicle 
manufacturing and sales to China by 2003, indicting the first time a Japanese automobile 
company broke into the Chinese market for reverse exporting.324  Meanwhile, Japanese 
headlines pointed to a rising China economic threat and the “hollowing out” of the 
domestic manufacturing sector.  Faced with a precarious mix of domestic political 
pressure and the alluring China dream, Tokyo ruled out permanent safeguards on the 
December 21 deadline.  Interestingly, both sides agreed to establish bilateral mediation 
boards with government and industry representatives to resolve future trade disputes.  
Beijing dropped all three tariffs, ending the tatami mat wars.325 
3. Sino-American Arms Sanctions (Implicit Coercive Lever) 
Given two high-stakes international disputes with Japan and the United States, 
2010 proved a banner year for coercive lever exercise in Chinese economic statecraft.  
The Sino-American dispute began exactly nine months before Captain Zhan’s fishing 
boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea following a 
series of announcements related to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales.  Like the Senkakus case, this 
case involved a periodic flare-up of an ongoing bilateral security dispute.  Unlike the 
Senkakus case, coercive lever exercise did not match asymmetric or situational factors.  
This mini-case confirmed H1 assumptions of implicit coercive lever exercise and partly 
confirmed H2.  The coercive lever process broke down when both the asymmetric and 
situational criteria were not met.  Beijing had two desired political objectives: 1) 
protesting continued U.S.-Taiwan arms sales; 2) protesting continued U.S.-China arms 
sanctions.  Both were intertwined with Beijing’s strategic goal of Taiwan reunification.  
Both objectives conflicted with H2 largely because Beijing lacked the coercive lever 
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capabilities in the asymmetric stage to alter either policy.  Though enough nationalist 
pressure existed in the situational stage to trigger coercive lever exercise, Beijing also 
overestimated its political latitude in the U.S.-China relationship, in which 
Hirschmanesque logic still favored the United States. 
Two U.S. announcements initiated the flare-u in this case.  On January 7, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Lockheed Martin a $978 million dollar contract 
to sell Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles to Taiwan, approved in 2008 by the 
Bush Administration.  As expected, Beijing condemned the sale as a violation of the three 
U.S.-China Joint Communiqués.326  On January 29, the Obama Administration notified 
Congress of its intent to sell weapons to Taiwan worth $6.4 billion dollars.  The list 
included 114 additional PAC-3 missiles, 60 UH-50M Black Hawk helicopters, 12 
Harpoon II anti-ship missiles, two Osprey-class mine-hunting ships and upgrade kits for 
Taiwanese F-16 A/B fighter aircraft.327 
Beijing’s response began January 30 with a strongly worded demarche delivered 
by Vice Minister He Yafei to U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman.  It noted the sale 
“seriously endangers China’s national security and harms China’s peaceful reunification 
efforts.”  Beijing’s list of consequences included limited suspension of military 
exchanges and cancellation of an upcoming bilateral security dialogue.  Unlike any 
previous response to an arms sale notice, Beijing made an unusual threat: it would 
impose sanctions against specific companies involved in the weapons sale to Taiwan, 
namely Boeing (Harpoon), Lockheed Martin (PAC-3), Raytheon (PAC-3) and United 
Technologies (UH-50M).  MFA reiterated the sanctions in public statements, but did not 
specify additional details.  Similar to the Senkakus case, Beijing’s propaganda apparatus 
engaged fully, pointing to myriad violations of the Three Communiqués.  As discussed in 
chapter III, Retired military officers affiliated with NDU and AMS weighed in with 
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bellicose commentaries, including Rear Admiral Yang Yi’s call to attack the profits of 
American companies involved in the sale.  However, Beijing did not apparently follow 
through on these sanctions.  Unlike the garlic wars or the Senkakus crisis, implicit 
exercise did not become explicit, nor did it last beyond early February when official 
references to the sanctions stopped.328 
Beijing then stumbled in the application stage by selecting a lever it could not 
exercise credibly.  In fact, a shift to explicit exercise could easily upset the balance 
between strategic and economic development priorities.  It follows that when implicit 
exercise failed to achieve results early on, Beijing lacked a viable policy option to 
facilitate explicit exercise.  U.S. Domestic political outcomes in the effects stage 
reinforced Beijing’s mismatch between lever selection and policy objectives.  Overall the 
case corroborates H2 assumptions that Beijing exercises explicit coercive levers rarely to 
achieve short-term, limited objectives.  It also suggests that while Beijing struggled with 
execution, its coercive lever process shows signs of increasing sophistication. 
Perplexed by Beijing’s aggressive response to the 2010 Taiwan arms sale 
announcement, analysts focused on evolving Sino-American relations since the first year 
of the Obama Administration.329  Bonnie Glaser pointed to four possible explanations for 
Beijing’s escalatory response that inform the situational stage.  First, Beijing was out of 
patience after more than 60 years of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and expected the new 
Obama Administration to meet the spirit of the 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement.  
Second, Beijing felt compelled to react strongly given the expectation of a nationalist 
backlash in elite and populist circles that perceived the sales as U.S. encroachment on 
“China’s core interests.”  Here, the case had two of Shirk’s three nationalist triggers by 
involving Taiwan and the United States (but not Japan).  Third, based on a honeymoon 
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period with the Obama Administration, marked by Obama’s successful visit to China in 
November 2009, Beijing expected Washington to delay the 2010 arms sale or at least 
begin reducing the quantity of weapons sold in accordance with the Three Communiqués.  
Fourth, Beijing believed that due to its stabilizing efforts during the 2008 financial crisis, 
“the power gap between China and the US was shrinking and that China’s growing clout 
provided Beijing with greater leverage to deter US arms sales to Taiwan.”330 
Based on the above analysis, two situational elements aligned to trigger coercive 
lever exercise: Beijing’s perceived gains in prestige and nationalism provoked by U.S.-
Taiwan foreign policy issues.  Several factors constrained Beijing’s coercive lever 
selection in the exercise stage.  Beijing lacked sufficient asymmetric interdependence in 
the U.S. arms sector to make its implicit sanctions credible.  The desired objectives were 
beyond the scope of Beijing’s capabilities against the target state.  The United States 
remained the world’s largest global economy and its only superpower; Beijing’s inflated 
prestige could not make up the differential.  In sum, the 2010 arms sale announcement 
was not a high-stakes crisis.  Though Beijing consistently protested past Taiwan arms 
sale announcements, the 2010 announcement paled in comparison to the 2008 arms sale 
in which Beijing suspended military-to-military diplomacy.331  
Underscoring the first problem, none of the U.S. companies named by Beijing had 
military contracts with China, nor had any received substantial commercial contracts over 
the past five years.332  Due to multiple U.S. arms sanctions against China, some dating 
back to 1949, U.S. companies remain prohibited from “exporting defense articles and 
defense services” to China.333  Of the four, Boeing had the largest market exposure in 
China with a commercial presence there since 1972.  In fact, Chinese aviation parts 
manufacturers built “horizontal stabilizers, vertical fins, the aft tail section, doors, wing 
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panels, wire harnesses and other parts,” for several Boeing airframes.334  During the 
dispute, Raytheon pursued a contract to provide air traffic control systems in Shenyang 
Airport, but had an otherwise marginal presence in China.  United Technologies sold air 
conditioners and elevators in China, not Black Hawk helicopters.  In sum, with the 
exception of Boeing, the U.S. companies did not depend on the China market for a 
significant profit margin.335 
In addition to Beijing’s weak asymmetric interdependence in the arms sector, a 
shift to explicit coercive lever exercise conflicted with broader strategic and economic 
priorities.  Despite the appearance of Chinese opportunism in U.S-China relations, the 
domestic political balance in China still favored inducements over coercion.  Consistent 
with the reform policy of “opening,” Beijing wanted to lure companies to China based on 
its international reputation as a responsible major power.  If Beijing looked forward to the 
unlikely event of future U.S. arms purchases, then threats against U.S. arms companies 
were counterproductive.  Prospects of a “win-win” outcome that supported “peaceful 
development” were much greater if based on the lure of China’s booming commercial 
aircraft market.  In 2010, Boeing estimated rising demand in Chinese domestic air travel 
would require a projected supply of 3,800 aircraft over the next 20 years valued at $400 
billion.336  Given Boeing’s integral role in the Chinese aviation parts sector, explicit 
sanctions would likely disrupt local supply chains and reduce export profits.  Sanctions 
would also potentially scare U.S. companies and the competition. 
Beyond asymmetric and situational weaknesses, Beijing’s limited influence 
effects in the target state posed a major obstacle in this case.  In contrast with the garlic 
wars and tatami mat wars, Beijing apparently misjudged its influence over the arms 
sector in U.S. domestic politics.  Since none of the four companies sold arms to China, 
Beijing could not target the profits from U.S. arms sales there, much less arms sales to 
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Taiwan.  Here, implicit sanctions rang hollow and lacked political credibility.  In fact, 
stock market prices of all four companies held steady despite the sanctions 
announcement.337  Additionally, the value of annual multi-billion dollar DoD contracts 
vastly exceeded the value of each company’s commercial contracts in China.  Again, 
Boeing presents a possible exception due to its integral role in the Chinese aviation 
industry and the expectation of future aircraft sales.  As argued above, actual sanctions 
would probably damage domestic productivity and threaten a major aviation supplier in 
China.  Instead, Beijing’s sanctions threat was unlikely to intensify lobbying in 
Washington to end a policy that clearly benefitted the U.S. arms sector. 
Beijing’s response to the 2010 arms sale announcement also raised perceptions of 
the China threat in Congress and protectionist debates over balance of payment issues.  
Beijing’s timing was unfortunate as well with midterm congressional elections nearing.  
As discussed in chapters II and III, U.S. perceptions of the China threat evolved over the 
past two decades in which China gradually replaced Japan as the primary U.S. trading 
partner and economic competitor.  China’s currency policy, creditor status and massive 
trade surpluses became useful explanations for a declining U.S. manufacturing sector.  
Though lacking official weight, retired Major General Luo’s suggestion China should try 
“dumping some U.S. government bonds,” became sufficient evidence of the threat.338  
As the Taiwan arms sale dispute played out in Congress, President Obama made 
comments to senators in February suggesting the U.S. Treasury Department might 
declare China a currency manipulator for the first time in 16 years.  Senator Grassley 
commented that such actions might “get China’s attention and lead to a more level 
playing field for U.S. exporters.”339  Ironically, Beijing’s implicit sanctions yielded more 
value in U.S. domestic politics than in Chinese economic statecraft. 
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From Beijing’s perspective, it probably looked as though the 2010 Taiwan arms 
sale dispute risked evolution to a full-scale U.S.-China trade war.  Noting the U.S. 
currency debate as evidence of “China bashing,” a Xinhua editorial declared, “China has 
become the largest victim of U.S. trade protectionism since the outbreak of the global 
financial crisis.”340  Interestingly, MOFCOM announced February 5 it would impose 
dumping duties on imports of U.S. chicken parts.341  Though a profitable product, this 
explicit lever lacked the magnitude of REEs in Japan.  For China, the economic 
consequences of designation as a currency manipulator far exceeded the impact of 
threatened arms sanctions against the United States.  Having tested the new 
administration with a battery of coercive threats, Beijing refocused diplomatic emphasis 
on mutual cooperation.  A tuning point occurred during meetings between Deputy 
Secretary of State James Steinberg and State Councilor Dai Bingguo in Beijing in March.  
It became clear to Chinese officials the U.S. side would not back down from its Taiwan 
policies.  Having tested the new administration with a battery of coercive threats, Beijing 
refocused diplomatic emphasis on mutual cooperation.  By late March, both sides made 
efforts to mend ties and the Treasury Department did not follow through on its implicit 
threat to declare China a currency manipulator.342 
Ironically, the RMB and debt levers presented Beijing with stronger policy 
options than the arms sanction lever it ultimately selected in this dispute.  At least two 
factors prevented selection.  First, as discussed in chapter III, Beijing is reluctant to 
exercise these levers explicitly, though this preference could change with additional 
experience.  Second, situational conditions in the U.S.-China relationship would not 
trigger either lever as a viable policy option despite provoking Chinese nationalism.  
Beijing’s prestige did not convey additional explicit leverage in the relationship, while 
implicit exercise raised perceptions of the China threat in U.S. domestic politics. 
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Similar to the REE lever, the RMB and debt levers evolved from reform era 
policies intended to pave the way for WTO accession and promote export-led growth.  
Key policies in 1994, “unified China’s foreign exchange regime, devalued the currency, 
and established current account convertibility.”343  Until 2005, Beijing pegged the RMB 
to the dollar and kept its value low to promote exports.  Following China’s WTO 
accession in 2001, surging Chinese exports created large annual trade surpluses with the 
United States.  Because the RMB was not convertible on the capital account, Beijing 
balanced its trade surplus by purchasing U.S. treasury bills.  By 2008, China replaced 
Japan as the United States’ largest foreign creditor.344  By 2010, China owned about 
seven percent of U.S. debt (~$1.3 trillion), reached an unprecedented trade surplus of 
$273 billion and faced constant U.S. pressure to revalue the RMB.345  While subject to 
contentious policy debates, none of these conditions emerged without complementary 
U.S. actions, including credit-driven consumer demand, large fiscal deficits and a 
declining manufacturing sector.346 
Though Beijing did not transition to explicit exercise in the application stage, this 
mini-case does suggest signs of coercive lever evolution in Chinese economic statecraft.  
The garlic wars and tatami mat wars were textbook trade disputes involving retaliatory 
tactics like tariffs and import bans.  Like the 2010 Senkakus crisis, the arms sale crisis 
was not a trade dispute.  Instead, Beijing exercised an implicit coercive lever in the 
context of an ongoing security dispute with strong nationalist overtones.  Though in this 
case, actual execution did not match achievable political objectives and Beijing could not 
make the shift to explicit exercise.  While the garlic wars and tatami mat wars were 
textbook trade disputes involving tariffs and import bans, this case featured a new tactic.  
Beijing had not imposed micro-sanctions against U.S. arms companies in a highly 
                                                 
343 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 104. 
344 Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” 8. 
345 For current figures, see U.S. Census data, accessed at: http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html 
346 Blanchard, “China’s Grand Strategy and Money Muscle: The Potentialities and Pratfalls of 
China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund and Renminbi Policies”; Drezner, “Bad Debts Assessing China’s Financial 
Influence in Great Power Politics”; Kirshner, “The Consequences of China’s Economic Rise for Sino-U.S. 
Relations: Rivalry, Political Conflict, and (Not) War.” 
 113
publicized dispute before, a tactic employed by the United States.347  Though poorly 
executed, this development suggests another level of sophistication in the role of coercive 
levers in Chinese economic statecraft that could yield different results in future cases. 
C. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCIVE LEVERS 
Coercive levers play an increasingly nuanced role in economic statecraft.  In the 
four cases analyzed in this study over the past decade, Beijing moved from textbook trade 
disputes to coercive lever exercise in response to high-stakes security crises.  With the 
exception of the Sino-American mini-case, these studies largely confirmed both 
hypotheses tested in this study.  The two hypotheses were: (H1), China applies explicit 
coercive levers rarely, and instead prefers the flexibility of implicit coercive levers; (H2), 
when China does apply explicit coercive levers, the intent is to achieve limited outcomes 
such as signaling resolve, official protest or short-term shifts in a target state’s behavior.  
If H1 informs Chinese preferences in economic statecraft, then H2 informs desired 
political objectives of coercive lever exercise.   
This study found that coercive lever exercise remains rare relative to inducements 
in Chinese economic statecraft.  Exercise patterns were reactionary.  If another state 
initiated a trade war, Beijing retaliated.  Beijing also demonstrated it will exercise 
coercive levers during high-stakes international crises, but only to an extent exercise 
supported limited political objectives such as signaling resolve, amplifying protest or 
accelerating dispute resolution.  In both types of scenarios, coercive lever exercise 
contributed to a coordinated foreign policy response.  It follows that if Beijing adopts a 
broadly coercive response during future crises, the likelihood of coercive lever exercise 
increases.  In all four cases, Beijing worked with the target states to repair relations, 
underscoring dispute resolution as a principal desired objective in Chinese economic 
statecraft.  Though reluctant to exercise coercive levers, China’s capabilities are evolving 
and it is becoming a more confident practitioner of an increasing range of policy options 
in economic statecraft. 
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This study highlighted coercive levers derived from asymmetric interdependence 
in specific sectors that allowed Beijing to punch above its weight class in economic 
statecraft.  Within China, these conditions often developed as unintended consequences 
of reform era policies that promoted deepening economic exchanges and integration with 
the global economic system.  Beijing’s recognition of levers derived from asymmetric 
interdependence increased its policy options during bilateral disputes with more powerful 
states or near peer competitors.  In some cases, coercive lever exercise became a suitable 
alternative to military force.  These findings contributed to previous research on the 
political consequences of interdependent economic exchanges by Hirschman, Keohane 
and Nye, Kirshner and Papayouanou among others.  These findings do not alter Beijing’s 
preference for inducements over coercion in economic statecraft.  Coercive levers may 
proliferate but exercise will likely remain a relatively rare event. 
This study divided into two parts.  Part one developed essential background for 
the case studied by surveying strategic and political economy trends informing Chinese 
economic statecraft.  Corroborating H1, the study found that due to grand strategic and 
economic development priorities, Beijing prefers inducements rather than coercion in 
economic statecraft.  Economic statecraft fit in by assuaging perceptions of the China 
threat abroad and promoting China’s international reputation as a responsible major 
power.  Corroborating H2, the study found that though Chinese economic statecraft has 
become increasingly important in Chinese grand strategy, political economy trends can 
limit the duration and scope of coercive lever exercise.  Due to the political primacy of 
economic development, coercive lever exercise can quickly reach the point of 
diminishing returns by threatening development priorities.  This finding explains 
constraints on lever selection and exercise duration. 
These strategic and economic guidelines did not impose hard constraints on 
Beijing’s foreign policy behavior in the context of economic statecraft.  During bilateral 
trade disputes, Beijing typically preferred the flexibility of implicit coercive levers, 
exercised behind closed-doors.  If implicit exercise failed and events escalated to crisis 
levels that exacerbated nationalist sentiments, then the intervening role of Chinese 
foreign policy making could facilitate explicit coercive lever exercise as a viable policy 
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option.  If coercive lever exercise exacerbated perceptions of the China threat or 
threatened domestic development priorities, then Beijing adjusted tactics.  Bearing on H1, 
this study assumed closed-door examples were more abundant, particularly since this 
tactic posed less risk to China’s international reputation.  Largely due to inadequate 
evidence, this study failed to adequately differentiate between closed-door and public 
examples of implicit coercive lever exercise.  Future research could build on Drezner’s 
hidden hand of coercion and apply game theory modeling to additional cases in Chinese 
economic statecraft. 
Part Two featured four case studies involving China, South Korea, Japan and the 
United States.  The first two occurred on the eve of China’s WTO accession and the last 
two occurred a decade later.  This study approached the case studies though a staged 
process based on Baldwin’s means-ends analysis of economic statecraft.  This study 
assumed that coercive lever exercise did not necessarily correlate with revisionist or 
status quo behavior.  It attempted to treat China as a neutral foreign policy actor that 
weighed the benefits and risks of various policy options against a range of domestic and 
international constraints.  Like all forms of statecraft, this decision-making process 
represented the essence of economic statecraft.  As an analytical tool, the staged process 
sought to isolate sequential stages of coercive lever exercise in Chinese economic 
statecraft to demonstrate how Beijing moved through asymmetric, situational, exercise 
and effects stages in each of the four case studies.  
 The study found the nature of asymmetric interdependence and relations with the 
target state were the key causal variables, consistent with research by Papayoanou, 
Kastner, Drezner, Kirshner, Shirk and Segal.  The garlic wars confirmed H1 and H2, by 
demonstrating clear examples of implicit and explicit levers that matched to achievable 
short-term objectives. China-South Korea relations were clearly warm, and yet Beijing 
imposed an import ban to signal resolve against Seoul.  It selected a lever that maximized 
the value differential between industrial and agricultural products in ways that amplified 
influence effects in the domestic politics of the target state.  This case also featured clear 
evidence of both implicit and explicit exercise.  Beijing warned Seoul in advance it 
would impose the import ban and then followed through with official action.  
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Nationalism sparked by the farmer suicides also played an interesting role in this case by 
adding a sense of urgency to Beijing’s foreign policy apparatus, a factor clearly evident 
in the Taiwan arms sale and Senkakus crisis cases.  
Beijing adopted similar tactics against Japan in the tatami mat wars, but both sides 
demonstrated restraint.  H1 was partly confirmed in this case.  Beijing did adopt a 
measured approach in the application stage compared to the garlic wars, and it is possible 
Beijing warned Tokyo in advance of its high tariff impositions during a closed-door 
session.  The case was a clear example of H2 due to the proportional relationship between 
explicit coercive lever exercise and discreet political objectives.  Once Tokyo dropped 
the temporary safeguards, Beijing dropped its high tariffs.  Asymmetric interdependence 
was slightly weaker in this case, but comparable lever selection with the garlic wars had 
similar influence effects in Japanese domestic politics.  Interestingly, nationalism was not 
a factor in this case.  On both sides, optimism based on the China dream loomed large in 
the wake of China’s WTO accession. 
In the 2010 Taiwan arms sale case, Beijing selected the implicit sanctions lever 
based on weak asymmetric interdependence in the U.S. arms sector.  It then matched the 
lever to unachievable political objectives beyond official protest.  This case partly 
confirmed H1.  When implicit exercise failed to achieve favorable influence effects in 
U.S. domestic politics, Beijing recognized the implicit sanctions lever lacked credibility.  
By then, it could not shift to explicit coercive lever exercise.  In fact, the threat of 
sanctions exacerbated U.S. perceptions of the China threat and played into protectionist 
politics (e.g., China bashing).  Though the dispute provoked high levels of nationalism, 
asymmetric interdependence in the arms sector did not support Beijing’s inflated prestige.  
As the world’s largest economy and its only superpower, the United States retained a 
considerable Hirschmanesque advantage over China that proved insurmountable in this 
case.  Though poorly executed, Beijing’s micro-sanctions against the four U.S. arms 
companies revealed another level of sophistication in coercive lever tactics that bears 
watching during future scenarios.  
Rising international scrutiny over China’s RMB and debt levers was part of this 
study’s inspiration.  Each symbolizes the mutual risks of deepening U.S.-China 
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interdependence.  Beijing has not exercised either lever in the context of a major bilateral 
dispute, including the 2010 Taiwan arms case.  There are several potential scenarios in 
which it could apply U.S. debt as a coercive lever, from the least likely nuclear option of 
dumping all U.S. securities to a more likely gradual approach based on past quarterly 
reductions.348  As Blanchard, Kirshner and Drezner argue, Beijing remains reluctant to 
exercise either lever coercively and prefers the influence effects of its creditor status.  As 
such, Beijing did not exercise the debt lever in the 2010 Sino-American case, despite its 
relative strength compared to the implicit arms sanctions lever.  Implicit threats have 
increased since then.  For example, Beijing criticized U.S. fiscal management in the wake 
of Standard and Poor’s downgrade of the U.S. credit rating in the summer of 2011.349  
Future research could consider various situational elements in bilateral crises in which 
Beijing could decide to assume the risks of debt lever exercise against the United States. 
As the heart of this study, the 2010 Senkakus case partly confirmed H1 and 
clearly confirmed H2, in which Beijing exercised the REE lever to achieve three short-
term political objectives against Japan.  The reactionary nature of coercive lever exercise 
under crisis conditions confirmed H1 predictions.  However, implicit exercise predicted 
by H1 was not apparent due to Beijing’s consistent denial of the REE embargo.  Three 
features differentiated this case from the others.  First, Beijing exercised the lever 
coercively in ways that maximized existing conditions of asymmetric interdependence in 
the REE sector.  Second, the lever matched the desired political objectives in terms of 
scope, duration and achievability.  Third, Beijing exercised an economic lever in 
response to a security dispute against a near peer competitor that was also a formidable 
economic and military power.  These findings suggest the role of coercive levers in 
Chinese economic statecraft will continue to evolve in unanticipated ways as China’s 
economic integration with the global economy deepens. 
                                                 
348 Caijing, “China Cut U.S. Treasury Holdings for 3rd Straight Month,” February 16, 2012. 
Accessed at: http://english.caijing.com.cn/2012-02-16/111684751.html; Caijing, “China Yuan Still 
“Undervalued” Says Geithner,” January 29, 2012.  Accessed at: http://english.caijing.com.cn/2012-01-
29/111642364.html 
349 Bob Davis, “China Slams U.S. Over Debt,” The Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2011; Keith B. 
Richburg, “China Bluntly Tells U.S. to End its ‘Addiction to Debts,” The Washington Post, August 6, 
2011. 
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As this study went to press, the Yomiuri Shimbun published an editorial noting 
reports that Beijing suspended Philippine banana imports through increased quarantine 
inspections.  These reports coincided with a tense China-Philippines flare-up in the South 
China Sea that began in April when the Philippine Navy inspected a Chinese fishing boat 
near waters claimed by both sides.  Connecting these events with the 2010 Senkakus 
crisis, the editorial reached a coercive conclusion: “The government has justified these 
responses by citing an increase of anti-China protests in the Philippines and the 
detection of pests in bananas, but it is likely that Beijing is attempting to pressure 
Manila over the shoal dispute.”350 
Perhaps Beijing impounded bananas rather than adopting more deadly 
forms of coercion.  Perhaps as Kastner and Papayoanou warned, these events mark 
the beginning of a retreat from the pro-growth consensus in Chinese politics.  If 
global demand for Chinese exports declines to an extent that Beijing has 
increasing difficulty delivering the goods to Chinese citizens, then perhaps a 
fundamental shift in preferences from inducements to coercion is possible in 
Chinese economic statecraft.351  As this study stressed, such an outcome would 
reflect a significant reorientation of Chinese strategic and political economy 
trends.  Even then, the decision-making process of statecraft will intervene as 
Beijing weighs the costs of exercising various levers to achieve desired political 
objectives.  At the very least, analysts can expect Beijing to repeat coercive lever 
tactics developed during the Senkakus crisis against target states in other regions, 
though not necessarily repeat exercise of the REE lever.  As China continues to 
deepen integration with the global economy, coercive levers derived from 
asymmetric interdependence will likely proliferate.  Whether these tools become 
coercive policy options depends on the evolving role of Chinese economic 
statecraft within the international system. 
                                                 
350 The Yomiuri Shimbun, “China-Philippine Confrontation a Warning for Senkakus,” May 24, 2012. 
351 Keith Bradsher, “China Output Slows Sharply; Ripples Feared,” The New York Times, May 25, 
2012, A1. 
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